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504
Louis Hoffner was wrongfully convicted in
preme Court of New York on January 16, 1941, of
degree murder and sentenced to prison for life. On N
vember 21, 1952, he was exonerated and released. Th~;
New York State Legislature passed an enabling Act to per·.
mit him to sue for false imprisonment. On June 17, 1955;i;
the State Court of Claims aw~rded him $112,291.00. Judge\~
Fred A. Young, in announcing the award, said in part:
"How can a man be repaid who has been branded a~,
murderer and whose one hope is an early death ta
release him from the sentence erroneously passed on
him? For this any award is bound to be ~ mere
token."
There are so many cases throughout the civilized world
where innocent men have been convicted that it would require volumes to adequately cover them. We have selected
the foregoing outstanding works and cases to show that
innocen~ men are convicted and that a reviewing court has
the obligation to examine the evidence impartially, especially in a case of circumstantial evidence, and not seek,
as the court did in this case, to find some evidence that
could be the basis for a jury verdict and because a verdict .~
was returned by the jury, to dismiss the appeal.
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APPENDIX A.
.otion for Leave to Appeal from Judgment of the Court
of Appeals Affirming Judgment on Verdict.
No. _________ _
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
APPEAL FROM
THE CouRT OF APPEALS OF CuYAHOGA CouNTY.

STATE OF OHIO,

Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
SAMUEL H. SHEPPARD,

Defendant-Appellant.

MOTION FOR LEAVE TO APPEAL IN A
FELONY CASE.
Appellant respectfully moves this Honorable Court
~for leave to appeal to this Court from a judgment of the
~Court of Appeals of Cuyahoga County rendered on July
,'i 20, 1955, wherein a judgment of the Court of Common
' Pleas convicting Appellant of a felony was affirmed.
Said Court of Appeals and Court of Common Pleas
committed error prejudicial to this Appellant in the respects set forth in the Assignments of Error and Brief to be
filed in this case.
Questions of public and great general interest are also
·involved.

'

t
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Appellant has also filed appeal herein on
tional grounds.
CORRIGAN, McMAHON

J.
Of Counsel,

BY WILLIAM

ARTHUR

E.

&

CORRIGAN,

CORRIGAN,

PETERSILGE,

APPENDIX B.
.Motion for Leave to Appeal from Judgment of the Court
t of Appeals Affirming Order Denying New Trial on
. · the Ground of Newly Discovered Evidence.

lt'

No.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

FRED W. GARMONE,

Attorneys for Defendant-Appellant.

APPEAL FROM
THE CouRT oF APPEALS oF CUYAHOGA CouNTY.

Notice.
To the Prosecuting Attorney of Cuyahoga County:
The Prosecuting Attorney of Cuyahoga County is
hereby notified that this Motion will be filed in the Supreme Court on Monday, August 8, 1955, and at the same
time the Appellant will request an extension of 'time for the
filing of the Assignments of Error and the Brief in this
case.

J. CORRIGAN,
Of Counsel for Defendant-Appellant.

WILLIAM

Acknowledgment of Service.
The Prosecuting Attorney for Cuyahoga County hereby acknowledges service of the foregoing Notice this 5th
day of August, 1955.
FnANK T. CuLLITAN,

J>rosecuting Attorney-Cuyahoga
County.
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STATE OF OHIO,

Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
SAMUEL H. SHEPPARD,

Defendant-Appellant.
MOTION FOR LEAVE TO APPEAL IN A
FELONY CASE.
Appellant respectfully moves this Honorable Court
for leave to appeal in this case from a judgment of the
Court of Appeals of Cuyahoga County rendered on July
25, 1955, wherein a judgment of the Common Pleas Court
overruling Appellant's Motion for a new trial on the
ground of newly discovered evidence was affirmed.
Said Court of Appeals and Court of Common Pleas
committed error prejudicial to this Appellant in the respects set forth in the Assignments of Error and Brief to
be filed in this case.
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Questions of public and great general interest are also
involved.
Appellant has also filed appeal herein on constitu-"
tional grounds.
CORRIGAN, McMAHON

J.
Of Counsel,

BY WILLIAM

ARTHUR
FRED

w.

E.

&

APPENDIX C.
Opinion of the Court of Appeals on Appeal from
Judgment on Verdict.
No. 23,400.
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

CORRIGAN,

CORRIGAN,

CuY AHOGA CouNTY, EIGHTH DISTRICT.

STATE OF OHIO,

PETERSILGE,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

GARMONE,

Attorneys for Defendant-Appellant.

vs.
SAMUEL H. SHEPPARD,

Notice.

Defendant-Appellant.

To the Prosecuting Attorney of Cuyahoga County:
The Prosecuting Attorney of Cuyahoga ~ounty is
hereby notified that this Motion will be filed in the Supreme Court on Monday, August 8, 1955, and at the same
time the Appellant will request an extension of time for
the filing of the Assignments of Error and the Brief in this
case.

J. CORRIGAN,
Of Counsel for Defendant-Appellant.

WILLIAM

Acknowledgment of Service.
The Prosecuting Attorney for Cuyahoga County hereby acknowledges service of the foregoing Notice this 5th
day of August, 1955.

T. CuLLITAN,
Prosecuting Attorney-Cuyahoga
County.

FRANK

•

OPINION.

July 13, 1955.
SKEEL,

J.:

This appeal comes to this Court on questions of law,
from a judgment of the Common Pleas Court of Cuyahoga
County, entered on a verdict of a jury finding the defendant guilty of murder in the second degree.
The defendant was indicted by the Grand Jury of
Cuyahoga County for the crime of murder in the first degree, it being charged that on the 4th day of July, 1954, he
purposely and of deliberate and premeditated malice killed
Marilyn Reese Sheppard. Marilyn Reese Sheppard who
was the wife of defendant, was found to have been murdered while in bed at her residence at 28924 West Lake
Road, Bay Village, Ohio. The report of her death was
first made by the defendant in a telephone call to the

t
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Mayor of Bay Village, J. Spencer Houk, a close friend of i
the defendant and the deceased, shortly before 6 A.M. i
July 4, 1954. Thereafter t'he police and firemen of Bay
Village, members of the homicide squad of the Police Department of the City of Cleveland, deputy sheriffs from
the Sheriff's office of Cuyahoga County and the County
Coroner and members of his staff, were called to the defendant's home and an examination of the premises was
conducted. The defendant was removed to Bay View Hospital, where he was questioned by the coroner, a deputy
sheriff and a police officer, and at some time thfreafter
made a written statement of the defendant's knowledge
and circumstances surrounding the death of defendant's
wife.
From the first time notice of the death of Marilyn
Sheppard came to the attention of the press, radio and
television stations, they immediately began to devote a
I
great amount of space in publicizing every conceivable
phase of the case. Every step of the way, the announcement of the death of Marilyn Reese Sheppard by force
:md violence, the investigation of the crime, the inquest,
the indictment and every step of the trial was headlined
and on many occasions editorial comment was indulged in.
The trial was protract'd over a period from October
18th to December 17, 1954. The jury deliberated on its
verdict from Dec. 17th to Dec. 21, 1954, including Dec.
19th which was a Sunday. The jury, consisting of seven
men and five women, were quartered in the Carter Hotel
of Cleveland, Ohio, under the care of two male bailiffs
during their deliberations.
Before the trial began on October 17, 1954, the defend. filed a motion for a change of venue, which motion

.'Was renewed from time to time before and during the trial.
'The defendant also moved to continue the case on the
~ i
ground that there had been so much publicity that a fair
''trial could not be had. These motions were overruled and
the trial had, resulting in a verdict of not guilty of murder
hn the first degree, but guilty of murder in the second degree. After overruling defendant's motion for new trial,
i the defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment as pro.t

· ~ vided by law.
The defendant claims the following errors:

"l. The Court erred in denying the defendantappellant's application for bail.
2. The Court erred in denying the defendantappellant's motion for a change of venue, which motion was repeated from time to time during the progress of the trial and repeatedly overruled.
3. The Court erred in denying defendant-appellant's application for a continuance, which was repeated during the progress of the trial and repeatedly
overruled.
4. The Court erred in compelling the defendantappellant to exercise peremptory challenges when the
Court should have allowed the challenge for cause.
5. The Court erred in denying defendant-appellant's motions for withdrawal of a juror and continuation of the case.
6. The irregularities occurring during the trial
and which reoccurred from time to time and to which
the defendant-appellant objected and which objections
were repeatedly overruled.
7. The Court erred in the dismissal from the jury,
after the jury was accepted and sworn, of Juror William Manning, and substituting in his place, over the

•
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objection of the defendant-appellant, Juror Jack
son.
8. The Court erred in not permitting the defe
ant-appellant to exercise a peremptory challenge a
such substitution.
9. There was irregularity in the proceedings 01·
the court.
'
I

~

10. There was irregularity in the proceedings of.'
the jury.
'~

).,

II. There was irregularity on the part of
prosecuting attorney.
12. There was irregularity on the
nesses for the State of Ohio.
13. There was error in the orders of the court;
by which the defendant-appellant was denied the~
benefit afforded him by the Constitution of Ohio and ~
the Constitution of the United States of America, in-·
eluding the amendments thereto.
1

14. There was abuse of discretion by the Court,
by reason of which the defendant-appellant was prevented from having a fair trial.
15. There was misconduct on the part of the
prosecuting attorney.
16. There was misconduct on the part of witthe Stat(• of Ohio.

IH'sscs for

17. The verdict is .dot sustained by sufficient evidence.
18. The verdict is contrary to law.
19. Errors of law occurring at the trial, prejudicial to the defendant-appellant.
20. Evidence prejudicial to the defendant-appellant was admitted over his objection.
21. Evidence excluded from the consideration of
th( · ·ry which was proffered by the defendant-appel-

· lant and which should have been admitted in evidence.
22. There were errors by the court in its charge
to the jury which were prejudicial to the defendantappellant.
23. There were errors by the court in refusing to
give special instructions to the jury prior to argument,
as requested by the defendant-appellant, and which
were afterwards not included in his general charge.
24. There was error by the court in overruling
the defendant-appellant's motion for a directed verdict of "not guilty" at the close of the State's evidence
in chief.
25. There was error by the Court in overruling
the defendant-appellant's motion for a directed verdict of "not guilty" at the close of all the evidence.
26. There was error by the Court in denying the
motions made by the defendant-appellant both at the
close of the State's case and at the close of the defendant-appellant's case.
27. There was error by the Court in not removing from the consideration of the jury the count of
first degree murder.
28. There was error by the Court in not removing from the consideration of the jury the count of
second degree murder.
29. There was error by the Court in not removing
from the consideration of the jury the count of manslaughter.
30. Other errors apparent on the face of the
record to the prejudice of the defendant-appellant,
and by reason of which he was prevented from having
a fair trial, as affirmatively appears from the record.
31. The indictment by the Grand Jury was the
result of pressure exerted on the Grand Jury.
(
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32. The concept of presumption of innocence'
established in the law was disregarded by the j
who in their deliberations substituted for it a
sumption of guilt.
33. That the judge in this case several days
fore the day of the trial met with newspaper report,
newspaper photographers, television personnel
radio commentators a~d arranged the courtroom ··
such a manner that the representatives of the pr
radio and television were given preference to .
space in the courtroom. He also caused to be b .-·•
and erected inside the bar a long table, which ex..
tended across the courtroom, and apprml:imately
twenty newspaper reporters were assigned seats at'
this table. One end of the table was within three feet
of the jury box. Outside the bar there are four rows:
of benches which are for the use of the public during~
trials. Each of these benches will seat about twenty ~
persons. The Court assigned the first three rows to
the personnel of the press, radio and television and in ..
advance of the trial caused printed slips to be made·~
with the names of such personnel printed thereon, j
and said printed slips were pasted at regular intervals,
along said row of benches so that said personnel re-"
£erred to would know which place was assigned to
him or her. The last row was reserved for members·
of the defendant's family and members of the family
of the deceased Maril~n Sheppard. The Court es- t~
tablished a rule that the admission of other persons ;i
to the courtroom was to be by card. The Court also
assigned to said newspaper, radio nnd television per- ;<
sonnel all the rooms on the courthouse floor, includ- .
ing the Assignment Room, where cases are assigned 'J
to other court rooms for trial. In these rooms said j
,.
radio, television and newspaper personnel had private
telnnhone lines installed and other necessary equip-

(
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ment to carry on their work. Space in the Assignment
Room was set over for the Chicago Tribune, Chicago
Sun, The New York Herald Tribune, the Akron Beacon Journal, The New York Journal American, The
Associated Press, The Pittsburgh Post Dispatch, the
New York Post, The New York Daily News, The
International News Service and the United Press.
There was also erected in that room special telephone booths and telegraph equipment which was
used to forward with dispatch the reports of the trial.
Rooms were also assigned to radio commentators
on the third floor of the courthouse. This is the floor
on which the jury deliberating rooms are located.
One such room located next door to the jury that
was impanelled in this case, was used by Radio Station WSRS and broadcasting continued from that
room throughout the trial and during the time that
the jury was in the room next door and during recess
and during the deliberation of the jury.
During the entire time of the trial a great number
of photographers, both television and newspaper,
stood on the steps of the courthouse, on the stairs that
lead from the ground floor of the courthouse to the
second floor and along the corridor on the second floor
from the top of the stairs to the entrance of the court
room. When the members of the jury came to court,
when they arrived for lunch or retired at the end of
the trial day, they passed along the way above outlined and were photographed and televised many
times, all with the knowledge of the Court.
On a number of occasions, it was necessary for
counsel to confer privately with the court in chambers on points that were in issue in the trial. On such
occasions when said conferences were held behind the
closed door of the judge's chamber, there would be a
great rush of photographers, reporters, radio and tele-

(
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v1s10n personnel into the room which adjoined
judge's chambers. So great was the number
crowded into the room that it was necessary on su
occasions for coun~el to push their way out so
•
they could again regain their place in the courtroo
After counsel had secured their exit, then a grea1
number of such persons as described would cro,
into the judge's chaJillber to inquire as to the purp
of the meeting.
Each morning the defendant-appellant w,
brought into the courtroom approximately ten
utes before the trial opened, at which time he w,
surrounded by photographers and television operators;
and was photographed and televised many times. '!~
Many times during the trial there was constan~
moving in the part of the courtroom occupied by said~
reporters, radio and television personnel. They kep(:
going in and out and changing places and relieving,
one another.
·
·
Pictures of the jurors were printed in the new~';
1
papers and were shown on television in the evening.~
Newspaper pictures were taken in the home of one/,
juror by a Cleveland Press photographer and printed'
in that paper along with an account of how the:.
juror's family fared while the juror was in court.)·'
The fact was called to the attention of the court but
no action was taken.
.
The Court perritted p.hotographers t~ come into'
the courtroom and take pictures of the ]Ury panel
The court permitted photographers to go into the juey,
room and take individual pictures of the members of,
the jury. These pictures were printed in the news/
i..:;,
papers.
·
Television cameras were set up inside the courthouse with the knowledge and consent of the court.'
During the trial the Court was part of a television'
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. ' program that took place on the steps of the courthouse
·· ·in the morning at a time when the jurors were arriving. This program was arranged by a reporter
named Fabian, a representative of the Scripps-Howard
,. newspapers. The Court stood across the street and
~ watched until he received a signal and then walked
over to the Courthouse steps, mounted the steps and
had a conversation with said Fabian while the tele.,,.
· vision cameras operated.
On one day while the jury was leaving the courthouse, a man appeared on the courthouse steps carry;:· ing a sign referring to the case of Sam H. Sheppard.
Counsel for the defendant-appellant took this man
. r and the sign before the Court and requested that he
·be charged with contempt. Several days later when
counsel was not present, this person was released.
For months prior to the trial, news in the Cleveland newspapers were slanted against the defendant.
A front page editorial appeared in the Cleveland
Press demanding his arrest and urged he be subjected
to the third degree. Day after day the public and
jurors were treated to opinion-shaping headlines,
such as "Quit Stalling and Bring Him In"-"Sam
Declined July 4th Lie Test"-"Says Dr. Sam Talked
Divorce." - "Testifies Sam Changed Stories" "Charges Sam Faked Injuries"-"Says Marilyn
Called Sam a Jekyll-Hyde."
Statements were made by the Chief of Police,
Inspector of Detectives, Head of the Homicide Squad,
'"' members of the Prosecuting Attorney's office, which
were adverse and condemnatory of the defendant.
Affiant says that none of said persons testified in the
case.
The defendant in his testimony stated facts bearing upon his questioning by Cleveland detectives.
That evening the following headline appeared in the

..
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Cleveland News: "Kerr Called Dr. Sam a Bare F1
Liar." The "Kerr" referred to is Captain David
head of the Cleveland Homicide Squad. Again,
says that said Kerr did not testify in this case.
The jurors in their voir dire examination te
they read Cleveland newspapers and most of
had a Cleveland newspaper delivered into
homes.
The jurors received the case at 10: 30 A.M.
day, December 17th and deliberated until 4: 30 P
Tuesday, December 21st. This included deliberatio(
on Sunday, December 19th, from approxima 10: 30 A.M. to 6: 00 P.M.
•'
During the deliberations the jury Jras orde
sequestered and placed in charge of two male offi,
of the court. During the period of deliberation,
jurors were taken by the officers to their meals an(
at night were lodged in the Carter Hotel. During ·.
time the jury was allowed to separate and no femaJe
·~
officer of the court was appointed to supervise the
1
female members of the jury.
On one occasion the jury was separated
photographs taken of such separated groups. One,
photograph was taken of the women members of th~.,
jury in one group and another photograph showed
the male members of the jury in another group. Thi!
photographs of the groups as separated were printed',,.
in the newspaper~, and in order to arrange sm#
groupings, communications were made with the juryl
Other photographs were taken of the jury while at;
their meals, coming to the courthouse and leaving the~
courthouse.
..1
That during the five days of deliberation and
during deliberations the jury was in a room that waa
one flight of about twenty stairs from the courtroom;:
that the door from the court room to this flight of/
stairs was generally open; that during the delibera,;
~

•

tions the court room and the corridor outside was
filled with curious onlookers, reporters, television,
1 radio commentators and photographers. During this
time card games were in progress in the courtroom,
groups were visiting, a great number of people milled
-. · inside and outside of the court room, and the court
room and corridors resounded with laughter, loud
talk and noises. The floors of the court room and
corridor became stained and dirty, and strewn about
with papers, cigarette butts, empty paper cups and
various litter; that the atmosphere that existed during the trial and during the deliberation of the jury
l.'i' ' was not conducive to profound and undisturbed deliberations.
34. The court erred in overruling the request of
juror Eleanor Borke to put a question to the defendant appellant.
35. The jury consisted of seven men and five
women. When the case was submitted to the jury the
Court appointed two male bailiffs but no female bailiff, and after the commencement of deliberations the
· jury separated at night and the female members of
the jury were not in charge of a female bailiff and
were not supervised by an officer of the court; that at
, the hotel where the jury was quartered, the members
of the jury had free access to telephone and did communicate during such time by telephone to various
individuals.
36. The defendant appellant was deprived of his
liberty without due process of law and was denied
trial by an impartial jury by reason of the widespread
publicity and misinformation disseminated thorugh
the newspapers, radio and television stations, both
·; •. before and during the trial; that during the trial the
· jury was subjected to opinion-forming headlines and
editorials, with resultant mass hysteria and the crea-
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tion of an atmosphere of public opinion which made
a fair and impartial trial by jury impossible, all withlli,
the knowledge of the court and all contrary to
provisions of the Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States of
America and contrary to the provisions of Article I,:,
Section 10 of the Con~titution of the State of Ohio. 'l
37. There was error by the court in overruling
the motion by the defendant appellant for a new
trial."

the

,,

The first claim of error based on the failure of the
court to admit the defendant to bail must be olrerruled.
This was a question resting in the exercise of the sound
discretion of the trial court. The evidence produced at the···.
hearing of defendant's request for bail has not been t
brought into the record before us. In any event, su~h
ruling cannot now be raised after trial and conviction.
The second, third, sixth, ninth, tenth, thirtieth, thirtyfirst, thirty-third and thirty-sixth claims of error are concerned with denying defendant's motion for change of
venue and continuance, because of the manner in which
the case was publicized. The record shows that the case,
from the date of Marilyn Sheppard's death, until after the
verdict was returned and the motions for new trial were
filed and heard, received lmusual coverage by the press,
radio and television. No case in this community ever
attracted such public interest or received so much attention by news disseminating agencies. Some of such publicity unquestionably was intended to spur on the investigation and was highly critical of the defendant and went
so far in some instances as to have been designated by ,
other newspapers as an attempt to try the case in the '

(

public press before he was indicted. All of this is argued
';~Y the defendant as establishing that the court committed
.: an abuse of discretion in refusing to continue the case to
''a later date or to order a change of venue.
.
The legal questions presented by these assignments of
error are not to be decided by a consideration of the pub1r<
} licity and the tendencies it might have in influencing the
·• public mind generally with regard to their judgment of
whether the defendant was guilty of the crime charged
against him. The legal question is whether or not the de; fendant would be accorded a fair, constitutional trial by
an impartial jury who would decide the issues of fact entirely by considering only the evidence submitted to them
in open court, without the slightest outside influence, when
,, considered in the light of the law as given them by the
court. The best test as to whether or not a fair and impartial jury can be secured is the examination of jurors summoned as provided by law, on the voir dire examination.
In the case of Townsend vs. State, 17 C. C. (N. S.)
380, the court said:
"The examination of jurors on their voir dire affords
the best test as to whether or not prejudice exists in
the community against the defendant; and where it
appears that the opinions as to the guilt of the defendant of those called for examination for jurors are
based on newspaper articles and that the opinions as
formed are not fixed but would yield readily to evidence, it is not error to overrule an application for a
change of venue." (affirmed 88 0. S. 584 without
opinion).
In the case of Hawkins v. State, 27 Oh. App. 297, the
indictment was for a violation of the Crabbe Act. The

4
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plaintiff in error had attempted to organize the citizens of
Lorain Cou11 ty against certain public officials of th~'
county, calling for a special grand jury to investigate the',
killing of an insane citizen by a public official. While en~~
~
gaged in such activities, the plaintiff in error was indicted,,~'
under the Crabbe Act, resulting in a great deal of news-'. ;.
paper comment both for and against him by the news· ,
papers and also some members of the public. During the j
impanelling of the jury, five veniremen were excused for
cause after statements that they had fixed opinions regarding the guilt or innocence of the plaintiff in error that
would require evidence to remove. The trial cotirt overruled plaintiff in error's motion for change of venue. The
court held:

"1. Unless it be shown that a fair and impartial
trial cannot be had in the county where an indictment
originates, a criminal trial must be tried there.
2. The accused of crime has a right to fair and
impartial trial, and, if impartial jury cannot be impanelled in county in which indictment was found,
trial court must grant motion for change of venue.
3. Whether or not an order granting change of
venue in a criminal case should be made rests largely
within the sound discretion of the trial court.
4. Appellate coprt should not disturb trial
court's ruling on motion for change of venue in
criminal case unless it be clearly shown that trial
court has abused its discretion.
5. Denying change of venue for local prejudice
of trial for transporting liquor in violating of Crabbe
Act (Sec. 6212-13 to 6212-20 G. C.) held not abuse of
discretion, notwithstanding that affidavits filed in
support of the motion alleged that the defendant had
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been criticized and denounced for activities in circulating petitions calling for the removal of certain
county officials from office and upon occasions of
previous arrests on various criminal charges."
In the case of Richards v. State, 43 Oh. App. 212 the

"2. That trial court denied change of venue without prejudice until it could be determined whether
fair and impartial jury could be impanelled, held not
abuse of discretion. (Sec. 13427-1 G. C.; 113 0. L.
132, Art. I, Sec. 10 Constitution)."
Other Ohio authorities are:

12 Ohio Juris. Sec. 97, p. 128;
12 Ohio Juris. Sec. 853, p. 844;
State vs. Stemen, 90 Oh. App. 309;
Dorger vs. State, 40 Oh. App. 415;
Johnson vs. State, 6 0. L. Abst. 707;
State vs. Deem, 154 0. S. 576.
From the foregoing authorities, the law of Ohio is
clear that the best test of whether a defendant can have a
constitutional trial in the county in which the indictment
is returned is to be determined upon the impanelling of
the jury. Citizens summons for jury service represent a
cross section of the community. Their answers to questions directed to them in the process of impanelling a jury,
gives a clear cut picture of their state of mind; their answers indicating whether or not they will be guided by
the evidence alone in reaching conclusions of fact, must
be given great weight in considering the question presented by a motion for change of venue. When the great
majority of the prospective jurors called or summons as
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arged that defendant permitted such dogs to run at large
. otwithstanding their dangerous propensities of which
.efendant had full knowledge. In this case there was
:~tensive newspaper coverage including direct declara,_tions of defendant's guilt and that he knowingly kept
savage, vicious killer dogs. The court, in overruling a
'motion for change of venue held that widespread publica,tion of belief or opinion by the press, of defendant's guilt,
~,does not show serious doubt whether defendant will receive a fair trial so as to warrant change of venue since
the press is entitled to public news with fair comment.

provided by law to be impanelled in a criminal case sta
they are not and will not b~ subject to outside influence
accepted on the jury, a trial judge who overrules a motio:
for change of venue under such circumstances is not guil ·
of an abuse of discretion. The very foundation of the j~
system is founded upon the inherent honesty of our citi~
zens in performing courage~usly such public service with-'
out fear or favor.
,
The law of Ohio on this subject is in complete accordi
with the great weight of authority as shown by the
opinions of a great majority of the courts of last rer5ort.
~.

See also:

In the case of Viereck vs. U. S., 130 Fed. 2d. 945, ·
which was a prosecution for violation of the "Propaganda
Agency Act" where a change of venue was asked because
widespread newspaper stories had aroused the community
against the defendant, the court held that the overruling
of suchi motion did not constitute an abuse of discretion
where the record revealed that the jury was chosen very '
carefully and both sides accepted the jury which was
eventually sworn.

People vs. Connors, 251 Mich. 99;
People vs. Swift, 172 Mich. 473;
People vs. Broady, 90 N. Y. S. 2d 864;
State vs. Burns, 84 A. 2d 801 (Rhode Island);
State vs. Cooper, 92 A. 2d 786 (New Jersey);
Jones vs. State, 240 S. W. 2d 771 (Texas);
People vs. Walker, 246 Pac. 2d 1009 (Calif.);
Wininger vs. State, 257 Pac. 2d 526 (Okla.);
Wetzel vs. State, 76 So. 2d 188;
State vs. Loveless, 80 S. E. 2d 442 (W. Va.);
Terrance vs. Commonwealth, 265 S. W. 2d 40
(Ky.);
State vs. Williams, G2 N. W. 2d 742 (Iowa 1954);
State vs. Godwin, 3 S. E. 2d 347 (216 N. C. 49)
(N. C. 1950).

'i

In the case of People vs. Broady, 90 N. Y. S. 2d 864, .f
I
which was a wire-tapping prosecution, the court held that '
newspaper comment alone, even though extensive, does ,
not establish that a defendant cannot be afforded a fair ',~
tri;1l in the county where the irnlictmc11t was returned and
overruling request for change of venue did not constitute
prejudicial error.
Likewise, in the case of People vs. Sandgren, 75
N. Y. S. 2d 753, the defendant was charged with second
degree manslaughter resulting from the killing of an
eleven year old boy by defendant's dogs wherein it was

(

In the case of State vs. Bird, 198 Pac. 2d 978 (Wash.)
t the Supreme Court affirmed the overruling of a motion for
~- change of venue in a homicide case where there had been
many newspaper accounts, the crime being one of great

i
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brutality and held that a denial of such motion based
claimed local prejudice, was not error in the absence
a showing that a situation had been created which wo
prevent defendant from receiving a fair trial before
impartial jury. It was likewise held in the case of Terra
vs. Commonwealth, 265 S. W. 2d 40 (Ky.) that a defendan•
in a homicide case was not prejudiced by the denial of ~I
motion for change of venue and it was not an abuse of
discretion to overrule such motion despite newspaper and'
radio publicity in a county of approximately 500,000 pe<>':'.
pie, where there was a large reservoir of qualified jurors:
Also, the Supreme Court of Georgia in the case of Morgan~
vs. State, 84 S. E. 2d 365, 211 Ga. 172, in which defendant
had been charged with murder, it was shown that newspapers had carried news items and editorial comment to
the effect that defendant had confessed the crime for
which he had been indicted and also articles had been
published about the defendant of an inflammatory nature.
It was held that such facts were not sufficient in themselves to establish that a fair and impartial trial could not
be had in the county in which such newspapers were published in the absence of further allegations and proof that
jurors who had been summoned to try the case had read
the articles and publicity and had formed fixed opinions as
to the guilt or innocence from such newspaper articles.
\_,.

As shown by the foregoing authorities, a refusal to
continue a case because of adverse publicity, is to be
decided by the same rules as are applicable in considering
a motion for change of venue. Snook vs. State, 34 0. App.
60. Anno. Delaney vs. U. S., 39 A. L. R. 2d 1314 para. 4
page 1321.

t

The record in this case discloses that a special venire
called for the trial of this defendant as provided by
. 2945.18 R. C. Seventy-five names were drawn from
' ~e jury box. Of this number eleven were immediately
', cused for justifiable reasons or were not found, and
uld not be summoned (three in number) by the sheriff.
the remaining sixty-four, thirteen were excused beuse they had formed a firm opinion as to the guilt or inrtlocence of the accused and ten were likewise excused
cause they were opposed to capital punishment. Six1een others were excused for cause.
The State used four peremptory challenges and the
defendant five. As is provided by Sec. 2945.21 the State in
; a homicide case where there is but one defendant, is entitled to six such peremptory challenges and the defendant
n
,. a like number so that when· the jury was sworn the de~ fendant left the right to one peremptory challenge unused.
·~ From the foregoing analysis of the venire of 75 electors
i ~lled in this case, four of those called were not needed in
~ empanelling a jury of twelve. Such jury was selected as
,,
~ provided by law and sworn and accepted by the defend$. ant to well and truly try and true deliverance make be< tween the State and the defendant.
The parties agreed to select two alternate jurors as
provided by Sec. 2313.37 R. C. The four remaining jurors
' of the original list, together with an additional venire of
24 summoned as provided by law, were used for this purpose. Of the 24 summoned, eight were called and ques1~ tioned together with the four from the original venire, in
':1 impanelling the two alternate jurors. Of those examined,
X three were excused for holding a firm opinion of the guilt
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or innocence of the accused, four were excused as bei
against capital punishment, one was excused on chall~
for cause and each side used one peremptory challe :·
(Each side had the right to excuse two prospective al '
nate jurors peremptorily under the provisions of
2313.37 R. C.)
The analysis of the empanelling of the jury in
case where but sixteen prospective jurors out of 72
amined could not sit because they had prejudged the g ,
or innocence of the accused, clearly shows that there wad!
no difficulty whatever in impanelling a fair and impartiaf!·l
jury.
~
The jury having been impanelled as provided by law~:
and sworn to afford the defendant a fair and imparti~ ''
trinl, and to come to its verdict by a consideration of the ;
evidence submitted in open court without any 1outside in- ;;
flucnce or consider8tion, and where there is no claim of ·
misconduct on the part of any member of such jury dur- ·
ing the tri8l, there can be no ground to claim a mistrial
because of continued publicity, publicizing the events of
the trial, and other related matters.
Claims of error Nos. 2, 3, 6, 9, 10, 13, 14, 31, 33 and '"
36 are therefore overruled.
The defendant has grouped assignments of error numbers 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, and 14 under the general topic of
"Errors in impanelling the Jury."
The first complaint of the defendant has to do with the
court sustaining objections of the state to questions propounded to a prospective juror (Ver linger) concerning
what effect the defendant's affairs with other women would
have on him, that is "would that prejudice you against
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, or create in you a sense of ill-will toward him so that
would disregard the proof necessary to convict him of
degree murder?" The evident purpose of this ques1
'in was to find out what effect evidence of extra-marital
'vities of the defendant, if shown, would have on the
or's consideration of other evidence. In the form in
.'hich the question was asked, it was objectionable in that
asked the juror what his conclusions would be upon con'dering such testimony. The question as framed was very
ifficult to understand. The meaning ascribed to the ques'~on by the defendant in argument would have been
"proper. After the objection was sustained the defendant
'. reframed the question and the court, over the objection of
the State, allowed it to be answered. We do not find that
the defendant was prejudiced by the court's sustaining the
' .State's objection when considered in the light of the complete examination of all of the jurors by both the State
and the defendant on the subject. The question in a
. modified form was asked of all but three of the jurors (who
. were sworn and served in the case) and answered without
objection. The cases cited by defendant are not directly
in point. They deal with the question of prejudice against
· a defendant himself because of race or other associations
, or conduct.
As to the juror "Borke" a question much like the one
propounded to juror Verlinger considered, was asked and
the state's objection thereto sustained. It does not appear
that defendant reframed the question and the subject was
not pursued further. As to the jurors who were excused
, peremptorily by the defendant, three were permitted to
answer a question on the subject of the same tenor as was

'
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answered by the nine jurors selected to try the case,
prejudice because of marital infidelity of defendant
two were not interrogated on the subject.
After the jury was sworn and the agreement to
panel the two alternate jurors was had, it came to the a
tion of the court upon information received from an OU!
side source, that juror "Manning" had not told the tnl'
in answer to a question as to whether or not he had b
a witness in a criminal case. The juror's answer had b ·:t.
"No." The information that then came to the court
parties was that this juror had been arrested on a mor,
charge and upon conviction had been sentenced to
workhouse, sentence suspended. This took place in 1943~::
The court, after knowledge that the state was going:'
to object to juror Manning, although then sworn as a:~
juror, prnceedcd to empanel the alternate jurors. Afterj
the alternate jurors were sworn Juror Manning was then .
asked if he had testified in the 1943 incident to which he'~
answered, "I believe I did, sir. I don't know, yes, I did.",~1
He also stated he had gotten into an emotional state of~
mind by having this past experience given such publicity.
He stated that since the happening of such event he hadi
lived an honorable life and was the father of a family.<
The defendant entered an objection to juror Manning being
dismissed from the jury. After the alternative jurors
were sworn juror Manning stated in part in open court:
"I tried to be absolutely unbiased and unprejudiced in
talking to other people, even in speaking outside the
jury. But after what has happened, I would not be
able to sit in the box with the other jurors, be able to
sit in this case and be unbiased, unprejudiced or unemotional is what I am trying to drive at mostly. If
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keeps up, if I am kept on the jury, I think I will
··~be a sub-headlines as long as the trial goes on. I will
' definitely have a nervous breakdown in a very short
.t, time and, in fact, I feel I am just about ready for
~- one right now."
, The court excused Juror Manning in the exercise of
sound discretion, under the authority of Sec. 2945.29
C. which provides:

;'."If before the conclusion of the trial a juror becomes
sick, or for other reason is unable to perform his
duty, the court may order him discharged. In that
case if alternate jurors have been selected, one of
them shall be designated to take the place of the juror
so discharged * * *_,,
The defendant entered his exception to the proce-

~ure used by the court in discharging juror Manning and
:.cJ.emanded the right to exercise his remaining peremptory
. challenge when the first alternate juror was seated in the
'j>anel after Manning was discharged, which request was
l'efused.
./j After a jury is sworn and charged with the delivery of
'.the
,,... defendant, the trial is commenced and unused peremp~fl;Jry challenges cannot thereafter be used and where an
3
alternate juror has been selected and sworn as provided
i by law, he must be seated in the place of the discharged
f juror by order of the court.
One other error is claimed in the impanelling of the
jury. The court granted the state's challenge for cause as
to juror Richter who was called to be impanelled as the
,'.'9€Cond alternate juror. The evidence shows that this
;:; prospective juror had met both the defendant and his wife
rand had played golf with Mrs. Sheppard. Under oath,
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however, she stated that her "acquaintance with
was so slight that I don't think-I know it would not in
£ere with my opinion." After again answering "yes" to
question of whether she could be a fair and impartial j
in the case, keeping in mind that she had known both ...... _
defendant and deceased, the court granted the state's mi·
tion challenging her for cause. Section 2945.25 R. C. d~
not include acquaintance as a ground of a challenge f1
cause and when a prospective juror under oath states tha1
such acquaintance will in no way prejudice her and
she can act fairly and impartially as a juror, it constitu
error to grant a motion to discharge a juror for cau~.
Such error, however, was not prejudicial to the rights
defendant for two reasons. First, the second alternate
juror empanelled after Richter was dismissed, did not become a member of the panel that was finally c4arged with,
the deliverance of the defendant at the conclusion of the
trial. At the conclusion of the trial the second alternate
juror was dismissed and took no part in deliberating upon
the verdict. Add second, the state did not use up its per-··
emptory challenges in empanelling the alternate jurors and
it is therefore quite probable that it would have excused f
juror Richter peremptorily had the motion to dismiss her
for cause been overruled.
,
Assignments of error Nos. 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 and 14 are ~
therefore overruled.
Assignments of error Nos. 17, 18, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28
and 29 are treated together in defendant's brief under the
heading: "The court erred in denying the motions for directed verdict or for dismissal of the indictment." This ··
heading is divided into three sections:

"l. The state has the burden of proof to establish
·' defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
"'.
2. In the absence of substantial evidence on all
· the elements of the crime charged against the defendants, it is the duty of the court to direct a verdict.
3. That there is no substantial evidence of defendant's guilt but rather supports defendant's story
and is inconsistent with his guilt."

'~·.

o!
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The elements of the crime of murder in the first deas here charged against defendant and as defined
···~ Sec. 2901.01 R. C. are that defendant purposely killed
ilyn Sheppard of deliberate and premeditated malice.
. .ere is no question but that the venue of the crime
~Charged is in Cuyahoga County, Ohio. Likewise, the death
!iof Marilyn Sheppard is not in question. That she was the
victim of a brutal murder is not in dispute. The defendant
in his brief on page 267 says:
"It is true that an intent by someone to kill the decedent and that there was malice on the part of whoever
did the killing may be inferred from the nature of the
wounds and from the brutal and vicious attack that
was made."

/And on page 12 of his brief defendant says:
"Marilyn Reese Sheppard, aged 30 years, was murdered in the bedroom of her home some time between
midnight and 5: 30 A.M. on Sunday July 4th, 1954."
The murder is described in the closing arguments of the
state (record p. 6904) "as one of the most brutal and vici~us murders in the history of crime." The evidence of the
i>athologist of the coroner's office and county coroner givXing opinion evidence of the cause of death, supported by
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pictures, portrays in all of its horrible detail the sc, ,
Marilyn Sheppard's bedroom on the morning of Jul
1954. Lying in a blood soaked bed with 35 separate wd'
evidently resulting from blows of a blunt instr '.,··
about her head and hands, in some instances of sufficit
force to cause fractures of the skull, is unquestionably~
ficient for the jury to find that the person who inflicted .
,_.,,
wounds upon the person of the deceased, acted with a p·
pose to kill. The only questions left for consideration
the jury, which fact must be shown beyond reasona·
doubt, that the defendant was the person who commi
the acts causing the death, and if established by that
gree of proof then to determine the degree of murder .
defined by the statutes.

endant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. It is the con'.tion of the state that only three people were in the
.eppard house after midnight of the beginning of July
' , that is, the 7 year old son of the parties, the decedent,
.d the defendant, and that all the circumstances as shown
, the evidence point directly to defendant as the one
iho perpetrated the crime. Also, the claim of defendant's
unt of his encounters with the supposed intruder or
.truders and his descriptions of him or them is so un·.evable as to give weight to the state's circumstantial
e. On direct examination in his own defense the dedant testified in part as follows:

We go, therefore, directly to an examination of
evidence dealing with this question. It must be rem~
bered that on appeal the court does not retry the issuei'
of fact but is concerned only with whether there is suf~
ficient and ample evidence to require a submission of the~
case to the jury and where a verdict has been returnedJ
whether there is substantial evidence (without weighirur,,
such evidence) to justify the verdict.
·i.''~

It is the claim of the state that the defendant and th~ .
defendant alone, caused the death of his wife. It is the con-,
1
tention of the defendant that a third person, or third per-'\
sons, was or were in defendant's house on the morning of "
July 4th, who was or were responsible for her death. This, 1
of course, is not by way of establishing a defense because 1'
the defendant has no such burden. It is enough if when ·~
weighing such evidence when fairly considered with all
the other evidence in the case, the jury does not find the ·
exi~~ence of the essential facts necessary to establish the
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"A. The first thing that I can recall was hearing
Marilyn cry out my name once or twice, which was
followed by moans, loud moans and noises of some
sort. I was awakened by her cries and in my drowsy
recollection, stimulated to go to Marilyn, which I did
as soon as I could navigate.
Q. Now, just one question here. Did you have a
thought in your mind at that time as to what caused
Marilyn to cry out?
A. My subconscious feeling was that Marilyn was
experiencing one of the convulsions that she had experienced earlier in her pregnancy and I ascended
the stairway. As I went upstairs and into the room I
felt that I could visualize a form of some type with a
light top. As I tried to go to Marilyn I was intercepted
or grappled. As I tried to shake loose or strike, I felt
that I was struck from behind and my recollection
was cut off. The next thing I remember was coming
to a very vague sensation in a sitting position right
next to Marilyn's bed, facing the hallway, facing
south. I recall vaguely recognizing my wallet.
Q. Now, just a moment. At that point have you
any way or can you determine-is there any w~ f
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determining the length of time between the time yo:~
were knocked out and when you came to this sitf ''
position?
A. No, sir, no way that I know of.
.
Q. Now, I am handing you state's exhibit 27 an1
defendant's exhibit T. Is that your wallet?
A. Yes, sir, it is.
Q. When was the last time you had it in yo
hand before I handed it to you this morning?
A. It must have been that morning.
Q. That morning. Now, you say-what?
A. I may have had it in my hand at the inquest.-~
I'm not sure whether Doctor Danaceau handed it to'·'..
me or just held it.
''
Q. I see, butA. Mr. Danaceau--excuse me.

** *

Q. Now, I have come to the point where you had'
awakened and saw the faint glow of your badge on
the floor. Do you remember?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Was there a light in the house anywhere?
A. Yes, sir, there was.
Q. That you remember?
A. There was a light.
Q. And where was that light?
A. I cannot say for sure, of my own knowledge.
Q. There was some kind of light?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Now, then, after you awakened or came to
consciousness repeat, as best as you can, in your own
words, to this jury what you saw and what you did.
A. Well, I realized that I had been hurt and as I
came to some sort of consciousness, I looked at my
wife.
(
Q. What did you see?

A. She was in very bad condition. She had
been-she had been badly beaten. I felt that she was
gone. And I was immediately fearful for Chip. I went
into Chip's room and in some way evaluated that he
was all right. I don't know how I did it. I, at this time
or shortly thereafter, heard a noise downstairs.
Q. And what did you do when you heard the
noise downstairs?
A. And I-I can't explain my emotion, but I was
stimulated to chase or get whoever or whatever was
responsible for what had happened. I went down the
stairs, went into the living room, over toward the east
portion of the living room and visualized a form.
Q. Now, where was that form when you first
visualized him?
A. Between the front door of the house and the
yard somewhere.
Q. Now, are you able to tell the jury what your
mental condition was when you came out of thisawoke from this attack?
A. I was very confused. It might be called
punchy, in language that we use as slang. I was stimulated or driven to try to chase this person, which I
did. MyQ. And when you saw the form, what did you
do?
A. Well, I tried to pursue it as well as I could
under the circumstances.
Q. And where did you pursue it?
A. Toward the steps to the beach at which time
I lost visualization of this form.
Q. Was it dark?
A. Beg pardon?
Q. Was it dark? Dark?
A. Yes, sir, it was dark but there was enough
light from somewhere that I could see this form.
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Q. Yes, all right.
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A. I descended the stairway and to the landing;'
and I visualized the 'form going down, or as he crune~
on the beach. And it was at this time that I felt that·,,
I could visualize a silhouette that was describable. ·•'j
IQ. What happened
on the beach?
I
A. I descended as rapidly as I could. I lunged
or lurched and grasped this individual from behind.
Whether I caught up with him or whether he awaited .
me, I can't say. I felt as though I had grasped an immovable object of some type. I was conscious thereafter of only a choking or twisting type of ~ensation,
and that is all that I can remember until I came to
some sort of very vague sensation in the water, the
water's edge.
Q. Were you able to determine anything about
that person?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And what?
A. Well, I felt that it was a large, relatively large
form; the clothing was dark from behind; there was
evidence of a good sized head with a bushy appearance at the top of the head-hair.
Q. Now, then, when you came to the second time,
just where were you?
A. I don't knoi exactly where I was. I wasQ. Were you on the beach?
A. I was on the beach with-Q. Where was your head and where were your
feet?
A. My feet were in the water and my head was
directed to the sea wall, toward the south, generally.
I could have been slightly askew. The waves were
breaking over me and even moving my lower part of
C 'UY body some.

Q. What was the condition of light at that time?
A. Light?
Q. Light, yes.
A. It was light enough to see at that time. I could
see Huntington Pier later when I came to enough
sensation to see at all.
Q. Day was breaking, is that right?
A. I would say it had broken somewhat.
Q. Day had broken. What was your mental and
physical condition as you remember it now, that you
were in at the time that you came to consciousness on
the beach?
A. My mental condition was that I was extremely confused. I didn't know where I was or how long
I had been there, or my own name, for that matter.
Q. Do you know how long you lied on the beach
before you got up?
A. No, sir, I don't.
Q. Well, you did get up to your feet?
A. I finally did.
Q. Do you know how you got up the steps? Do
you have any recollection of that?
A. I remember, as I finally came to enough sensation to get to my feet, I rather staggered up the
stairway and as I was going up, or as I was recognizing that this was my house, I entered the house and
came to the realization that I had been hurt and that
I had been struck by an intruder and I was then fearful for Marilyn alth0ugh I can't say that I actually
remembered of seeing her.
Q. You remember what?
A. I don't say that at that time I remembered
seeing her the previous time upstairs.
Q. How was your mind working? Was there any
blocking of your mental processes at that time?
A. The best I can explain is that my mind was
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working like a nightmare or a dream, very horrib:
dream.
.
Q. And then what did you do when you got :~
the house?
A. I eventually went up the stairs. I'm nots ..
just exactly how rapidly I went upstairs but I dicf
finally go upstairs and, it was at that time that I ~
examined Marilyn.
,.
Q. Was there enough light in her room then to'
see her?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. What did you see?
A. I saw that she had been terribly beat~n.
Q. Did you determine that she was dead?
A. Yes, I thought that I did.
Q. What was your feeling at that particular time, ·
if you had any feeling, that you remember?
.:,·
A. I was horrified. I was shaken beyond explanation, and I felt that maybe I'd wake up, maybe ,
this was all a terrible nightmare or dream and I
walked around, paced, I may have rechecked little :.}
Chip. Very likely I did, but I can't say specifically
that I did, and I may have gone back in to see Marilyn.
As I recall-I could have passed out again, I don't
remember but I was staggered. Finally I went down
the stairs trying to come to some decision, something
to do, where to turn. ; must have paced and walked
around downstairs trying to shake this thing off or
come to a decision and I thought of a number and
called it.
Q. What was the number you thought of?
A. I thought that the number was that of Mr.
Houk's.

Q. Where was the telephone?
A. There are two phones downstairs. I'm not
positive which one I used.
Q. And do you know how long it was, have you
any recollection of the length of time between your
telephone call and the appearance of Mr. and Mrs.
Houk?
A. It seemed like a long time, but it evidently
was a relatively short time.
Q. And do you know where you were or what
you were doing between the time that you made the
telephone call and the arrival of Mr. and Mrs. Houk?
A. I was walking through the house again and
trying to-trying to clear my mind, trying to remember what had happened, trying to remember a description of this individual that I had seen, trying to
differentiate whether there two people or one, in fact,
almost thinking there were two. I, shortly before the
Houks came, stopped in the kitchen and put my head
on the table and that is the first time I recall realizing
or recognizing that I had a very severe pain in the
neck. Up to that time I may have been holding my
neck but I don't remember. And at that time I felt
that my neck was injured."

l

Q. Do you recall what you said to him over the
phone?
A. No, I don't.
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On July 4, at 11 A.M. the defendant made the following statement to Officer Schottke of the Cleveland Police
Department as shown by the police report created July
7, 1954, which was received into evidence as "State's Exhibit 49":
"Sir:
The following is the list of questions asked Dr.
Sam Sheppard on the first time we questioned him on
July 4, 1954:
Q. Will you tell us everything that you know
about this?
(
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A. He stated that the Aherns were visiting
that he fell asleep on the couch before they left.
thing he remembers is that he heard his wife sere<
ing and he ran up the stairs and as he entered
room he thought he seen a form and at that time
heard someone working over his wife. He then
attacked and hit on the side of the head and knock1
unconcious. When he tegained consciousness he he<
a noise downstairs and he ran downstairs and seen
form going out the door leading to the porch. He rmi~
after this form and chased him down the stairs andJ
when he got to the boathouse landing he doesn't ~1
member if he jumped over the railing or ~f he ran;
down to the beach but he half tackled him and he~
struggled with him and was again knocked uncon-),
scious.
When he regained consciousness, he was on his -~
stomach on the beach being wallowed back and forth
by the waves. He then went up to the house aiid
Wjandered around in a daze and went up and went up
to his wife's room and attempted to administer to her
and felt that she was gone. He then went downstairs
and wandered around in a daze and finally a telephone
number came to his mind and he called this number
and it was Mayor Houk. He said that Houk came to
his house and also his brother Richard and he was
then taken to the hospital.
Q. Asked him t~ describe the screams.
A. Stated that they were loud screams.
Q. How long did the screams last?
A. Stated all the while he was running up the
stairs.
Q. Asked him if the same person attacked him
that he heard working over his wife.
A. Stated no, as he was under the impression that
he was attacked by someone else at the time he heard
' --meone working over his wife.
~

Q. Asked him how many times he was assaulted?
A. Stated two or three times at the most.
Q. With what were you assaulted?
A. He stated with fists.
Q. Asked him if he could describe the person that
went out the door, if that person was white or colored?
A. He stated the person must have been white
because the dog always barks at colored people. This
person was taller than he was, he was about 6'3" and
was dressed in dark clothing and was a dark complected white man.
Q. Asked him if he turned on any light at the
time he looked at his wife in the bedroom.
A. He stated no.
Q. Asked him if there were any lights on in the
house.
A. He stated he does not remember, he does not
recall.
Q. Asked him how he could see to administer to
his wife if he did not turn on any lights.
A. He stated he was able to determine there was
nothing he could do for her and that she was gone.
Q. Asked him as to the condition as to light and
darkness at the time he regained consciousness on the
beach.
A. He stated it was a little lighter than dark.
Q. Asked him if the doors were kept locked in
the house.
A. He stated the doors were never locked.
Q. Asked him if there was a great deal of money
kept around the house.
A. Stated no, only about $60 or $70.
Q. Asked if any narcotics were kept in the house.
A. Stated no, but there may be a few samples in
my desk.
Q. Asked him about Dr. Hoversten staying at his
house and where he was at now.

~
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A. He stated Dr. Hoversten was staying at
house for a few days but that he had left yester
afternoon to keep a golf date at Kent, Ohio.
Q. Asked him if he had heard rumors to the
feet that Dr. Hoversten was infatuated with his
1
A. He stated that he had heard those rumors b
he did not think anything about it and the rumo1':
might be true.
.
Q. Asked him if he knew of any men that may:
have stopped at his home while he was at work.
A. He stated that several men have stopped bu(
that his wife was faithful to him.
f
Q. Asked him if he could name any of them. 'j
A. Stated that he could not think of any names
right now.
Q. Asked him if he was running around with any ~
women.
''
A. He stated no.
Q. Asked him if his wife was running
with any men.
1
A. Stated no."
1

1

Defendant talked with Coroner Gerber at the hospital
at about 9 A. M. on July 4th. Dr. Gerber testified as to defendant's statement of the events of the morning of July ·
4th as follows:
"Q. Did you have a conversation with him?
A. Yes, sir.
'
Q. Now will you please relate the conversation?
A. I asked him if he could tell me what happened,
that is, I asked Dr. Sam Sheppard if he could tell me
what happened. He said he would try to and his conversation was as follows:
That he was sleeping on this couch or davenport
and that he thought he heard someone call him,
'Sam.' That he immediately jumped off the couch

'

and rushed upstairs. When he got to the head of the
stairs something clobbered him on the back of the
' neck or head, and that he was rendered unconscious.
He doesn't know how long, he stated, he didn't know
how long he was unconscious but when he came to he
thought he heard a noise in the living room. That he
rushed back down the stairs to the living room and
that he was-he thought that he saw some form going
out of the doors toward the stairs that lead to the
back. That he rushed after the form, and that when
he got to the foot of the stairs that lead actually to the
beach alongside of the boathouse or bath house, he got
into a wrestling match or hassle with the form and
that he was rendered unconscious again, and he woke
up later and went back up to the house and then went
into-up the stairs-went into the living room, up the
stairs to the second floor and into his wife's bedroom
and felt of her pulse at t~e neck; realized that there
was something wrong with her, something seriously
wrong with her, that she was probably dead. That he
came back downstairs and some time later called
Mayor Houk. I asked him if he could see this form as
he went up the stairs from the couch. He said, 'No, it
was too dark to see.' He couldn't see anything except
a form.
I asked him if he could see the form going down
the stairs to the beach. He said, 'No, just a form. Just
an outline.' I told him I would not ask him any more
questions and left. At the time that I was-he was
talking to me and I was asking these questions, Dr.
Richard Sheppard came in and another doctor of the
hospital came in and took-this doctor, other doctor,
took Dr. Sam Sheppard's blood pressure.''
,~ He also stated:

***

"That he rushed after this form. He couldn't tell
definitely what this form was, couldn't tell whet\
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it was a human being or whether it was a man
a woman, whether or not it had a hat on, whether~
not he could see any'hair, whether or not it had a C
or trousers on."
1

'

The foregoing was repeated at the inquest at Nonnand1.·
School as shown on page 3101 of the record.
On the afternoon of July 4th at about 3 P. M. the d~
fendant was again questioned by Officer Schottke at whichl,
time he stated in part as was testified to by Office#)
Schottke:
"We then told him that there was blood on1 the band,
and on the crystal of the wrist watch, asked him if he l
could tell us how the blood got there. He stated that'
he remembered that at the time that he regained con-::,
sciousness in the upstairs bedroom that he had felt his i ,
wife's pulse at the neck and felt that she was gone qnd ;
at that time he must have gotten the blood on the
wrist watch and he heard a noise downstairs and ran i,.j
downstairs."
;!

J

On July 10th defendant went to the sheriff's office at
the request of the authorities where a full written statement was made which was in part as follows (State's exhibit 48):

"* * * I evidently becrme very drowsy and fell asleep.

~

I recall wearing summer cord trousers, a white T ,:
shirt, mocassin type loafers with no shoestrings, I am
not sure of the socks. I don't know whether I had removed my brown corduroy coat that I had put on
earlier, or whether I did at this time or not. The next
thing that I recall very hazily, my wife partially awoke
me in some manner and I think she notified me that
she was going to bed. I evidently continued to sleep.
The next thing I recall was hearing her cry out or

(

scream. At this time I was on the couch. I think that
. she cried or screamed my name once or twice, during
which time I ran upstairs, thinking that she might be
having a reaction similar to convulsions that she had
had in the early days of her pregnancy. I charged into
our room and saw a form with a light garment I believe. At the same time grappling with someone or
something. During this short period I could hear loud
moans or groaning sounds and noises. I was struck
down. It seems like I was hit from behind somehow
and had grappled this individual from in front or
generally in front of me. I was apparently knocked
out. The next thing I knew I was gathering my senses
while coming to a sitting position next to the bed, my
feet toward the hallway. In the dim light I began to
come to my senses and recognized a slight reflection
on a badge that I have on my wallet. I picked up the
wallet and while putting it in my pocket came to the
realization that I had been struck and something was
wrong. I looked at my wife. I believe I took her pulse
and felt that she was gone. I believe that I thereafter
instinctively or subconsciously ran into my youngster's
room next door and somehow determined that he was
all right. I am not sure how I determined this. After
that, I thought I heard a noise downstairs, seemingly
in the front eastern portion of the house. I went
downstairs as rapidly as I could coming down the
west division of the steps. I rounded the L of the living
room and went toward the dining table situated on
the east wall of the long front room on the lake side. I
then saw a form progressing rapidly somewhere between the front door toward the lake and the screen
door. I pursued this form through the front door,
over the porch and out the screen door and then on
down the steps to the beach, where I lunged or jumped
or grasped him in some manner from the back, either
body or leg, it was something solid. However, \ i.
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not sure. This was beyond the steps an unknown
tance but probably about ten feet. I had the f.
of twisting or choking and this terminated my _-~
sciousness.
The next thing I know I came to a very gro
recollection of being at the water's edge on my fa
being wallowed back and forth by the waves.
head was toward the bank, my legs and feet w
toward the water. I staggered to my feet and c
slowly to some sort of sense. I don't know how lo
it took, but I staggered up the stairs toward the ho
and at some time came to the realization that som
thing was wrong and that my wife had bee~ injure<J.!
I went back upstairs and looked at my wife and fel(\
her and checked her pulse on her neck and determinetfor thought that she was gone. I became or thought.
that I was disoriented and the victim of a bizarre
dream and I believed I paced in and out of the roqm
and possibly into one of the other rooms. I may have
reexamined
her, finally realizing that this was true. I "
I
went downstairs. I believe I went through the kitchen
into my study, searching for a name, a number or what
to do. A number came to me and I called, believing
that this number was Mr. Houk's. I don't remember
what I said to Mr. Houk. He and his wife arrived
there shortly thereafter. During this period I paced
back and forth somewhere in the house, relatively
disoriented, not kno~ing what to do or where to turn.
I think I was seated at the kitchen table with my head
on the table when they arrived but I may have gone
into the den. I went into the den as I recall, either
before or shortly after they arrived. The injury to my
neck is the only severe pain that I can recall. I should
say, the discomfort to my neck. I didn't touch the
back door on the road side to my recollection. Shortly
after the Houks arrived, one of them poured a half
( 'i.ss of whiskey as they knew where we kept a small

· supply of liquor, and told me to drink it. I refused,
since I was so groggy anyway. I was trying to recover
my senses."
The defendant's statement of the facts as above set
r·
lrth
are to be found with some discrepancies, variations
omissions, in the testimony of other witnesses when
ed to tell what the defendant told them when ques,oned on the subject. The first declarations of the defend·~t were made to Mayor Houk who arrived at the Shep, d home shortly before 6:00 A. M. on July 4th in re~nse to the defendant's call. The mayor testified the dell

,fendant said:
"My God, Spence, get over here quick, I think they
have killed Marilyn."
,,He further testified that he went immediately to the Sheppard home and found the defendant in the den, and

r
·'

"I immediately went up to him and asked him what
happened, words to that effect, and he said, 'I don't
know exactly but somebody ought to do something for
Marilyn,' and with that my wife immediately went
upstairs and I remained with Dr. Sam and I said something to the effect of 'get hold of yourself' or something
like that 'can you tell me what happened?' and he
said, 'I don't know. I just remember waking up on the
couch and I heard Marilyn screaming and I started
up the stairs and somebody or something clobbered
me and the next thing I remember was coming to
down on the beach.' And that he remembered coming
upstairs and that he thought he tried to do something
for Marilyn and he says 'that's all I remember.'"
Officer Drenkham who received a call from Mayor
Houk at 5:58 A. M. and who got to the Sheppard home at
6:02 A. M. stated on direct examination as to what the{,_
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fendant said as to his actions when awakened by Maril
screams:

.ouk then testified that he heard the following conversa-

"A. I asked the defendant what had happen1
He said that he heard Marilyn scream that he rem .
bered fighting on the stairs that he was in the wa ~
and then he came upstairs."

"Dr. Richard bent over Dr. Sam and I heard him say
that 'she is gone, Sam,' or words to that effect, and
Sam slumped further down in his chair and said, 'Oh,
my God no' or words to that effect. And I then heard
Dr. Richard say either 'did you do this?' or 'did you
have anything to do with this?' and Sam replied,
'Hell, no.' "

Mrs. Esther Houk, wif~ of the mayor of Bay Villag1
who accompanied her husband to the Sheppard home,
going upstairs and viewing the revolting sight in the She·
- "';
pard bedroom, returned to the kitchen and poured out half
\
a glass of whiskey and offered it to the defendant jWith the
statement "this might help you." The record then ~
closes the following testimony by Mrs. Houk:

f

"A. He said, 'No, I don't want it.
clear now and I have to think.'
Q. And he did not take the drink?
·~
A. I asked him 'shouldn't this help?' but he is a
ddctor, he should know and he said, 'no.' So he didn't l
take it.
Q. I see. Then what occurred from the den?
A. I believe he was talking.

:l

*

*

*

*

*

Q. What did he say?
<.;
A. He complained of his neck. He said he thought ~·'
it was broken. He ntentioned kidding Steve about ;:
locking his house so tight. Ile said he remembered
being hit at the top of the stairs and either he was
chasing someone or someone was chasing him down
the stairs. I remember that, because I couldn't picture
anyone chasing him * * *."

The defendant's brother, Dr. Richard Sheppard arrived shortly after Mr. and Mrs. Houk and Officer Drenkham4 ~ .... d after viewing Marilyn, returned to the den. Mayor

Shortly after the foregoing conversation with defend! ant by those who first came to his house, Dr. Stephen ShepPID-d arrived with a doctor from Bay View Hospital (about
'"6:15 A. M.) and without consulting authorities, took the
defendant to Bay View Hospital.
On the following day, Dr. Hoversten testified about a
call he made upon the defendant to the hospital, when he
heard the following conversation between the defendant
and Dr. Stephen Sheppard:

"A. Yes, I remember I was sitting on the left hand
side of the bed and Steve sat near the foot of the bed
and he advised Dr. Sam to go over in his mind several
times a day * * * As I recall Dr. Steve addressed Dr.
Sam and said in words to this effect: 'You should review in your mind several times a day the sequence of
events as they happened so that you will have your
story straight when questioned' and then he gave as
an example 'you were upstairs and you went downstairs and from here to here,' and so forth."
An examination of the foregoing evidence shows that
as successive inquiries were made of the defendant, his
answers changed considerably. His first statement shows
that he did not reach the top of the stairs before encountering someone or a form. No mention is made about "Ch{"
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until the statement was made at the sheriff's office on J
10th. Likewise, the statements do not suggest that d,'
fendant examined the dec~dent on his first responding ..
her call, until after the green bag containing defendant'•
watch, ring and keys were found with blood on the crystal·
and band of the watch and such fact was called to his atten·
tion. There could be no possible way under the sequeni .
of events as testified to by the defendant in which blooaj
could have gotten on the watch unless it got there beforef
the defendant had his alleged encounter on the beach.

The officers who first arrived on the premises made a
mplete investigation of the house for evidence of any
fforcible entry, and found all windows and screens locked,
[~touched and in place, the screens being fastened from
~the inside and no damage was observed to any of the doors.
I Defendant testified that the doors of his home were never
\locked. However Mrs. Ahern testified that before she left
midnight on the morning of July 4th, she locked the
· door and chained it on the lake side of the house and the
maid testified of being locked out on one or more occasions
· when she came to work in the morning. She also testified
that it was the practice to leave the street door unlocked
· on the mornings she was to report for work, which was
on a fixed day each week. This testimony is supported by
that of Dr. Hoversten who said that the first day he visited
there in July when he came home at about midnight,
Marilyn called down to him not to lock the door because
the maid was coming in the morning. The record clearly
shows the maid was not expected on July 4th.

When the defendant fell asleep on the couc1¥- in the
living room on the evening of July 3rd he (by his own
testimony) was wearing a T shirt, pants, loafers and a
corduroy jacket. When the Houks arrived at 5:45 A. M. on
July 4th defendant was bare from the waist up and in his
statements claims no recollection of what happened to tlie
T shirt 1 The T shirt has never been found or accounted
for. Chief of Police Eaton when he arrived at 6:30 A. M.
of July 4th saw the corduroy jacket neatly folded on the
couch where defendant had been sleeping and Officer
Drenkham had noticed the jacket in the same position upon
his arrival at 6:02 A. M. No one of those who arrived at "'
the Sheppard home prior to the Chief of Police, testified i'
as to have moved or touch~d the jacket. The defendant is
not sure but says he has a faint recollection of having removed it while sleeping because he was too warm. Dr.
Stephen Sheppard testified having observed the jacket on
the floor. This was prior to 6:30 A. M. However, when
the photograph was taken at 8 A. M. the jacket was still in
the position as observed by Officer Drenkham and Chief
Eaton.

•
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Officer Drenkham testified that he patrolled Lake
,,, Road during the night beginning about 11 P. M. and con~? tinuing until 5 A. M. passing the Sheppard home on several
f'. occasions, and noticed no one on the highway at or near
the Sheppard home. He also examined the beach at the
J bottom of the steps by the beach house shortly after 6 A. M.
and found no foot prints in the sand. Defendant produced
two witnesses, one of whom reported that while driving
east on West Lake Road at about 2:15 A. M. on July 4th
he saw a big man over six feet tall and weighing 190
·~;" pounds standing in the Sheppard driveway wearing a light
T shirt but was unable to describe the rest of the dress. He

4
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testified that the stranger had a crew hair cut and was
bit tanned and that all this was observed in the dead
night while returning from' a fishing party at Sandus·
Ohio. The witness had a boat attached to his automobile'
and testified he was driving 35 miles per hour when he!,
observed the stranger in the drive near three maple trees~%
The other witness claims td have been driving west at;
about 4 A. M. when he observed a stranger near the cemetery which is just west of the Sheppard home. He de- j
scribed the stranger as having a crew haircut, was 5'9" tall
and had bulging eyes and was wearing a white shirt.
Neither of these witnesses came forward until a ~eward
was offered publicly six or seven days after July 4th although the story of Marilyn Sheppard's death had received
great publicity, including the story that defendant had
met with a form with bushy hair in the Sheppard home. '
after he heard his wife scream for help.
Defbndant's testimony was given in support of his
claim that his home life and that of his wife was loving
and harmonious. As opposed to this evidence Dr. Hoversten testified to conversation in which the witness read and
discussed with defendant a letter which defendant had
written and which he intended to mail to his wife, on the
subject of divorce. The sa1e subject was talked over on
several occasions and there is some evidence that the defendant discussed this subject with Susan Hayes. There
is also evidence that after Chip was born Mrs. Sheppard
was not sexually aggressive and that she had consulted
with defendant's brother Dr. Stephen Sheppard on the
subject and its effect on her relationship with her husband
(the defendant). Defendant admitted meeting with one
of his. 1 · 1.y patients, at her insistence and request on sev-

~~al occasions, taking her to Metropolitan Park on at least
[~ne ~ccasion where they kissed each other and being in-

(.yolved in an altercation between the lady and her husband
'~bout her attentions to defendant in Mrs. Sheppard's presence on a boat trip to Detroit. He called and was in com'[ pany of another young lady in California while his wife
f was in Cleveland. His intimate relationship with Susan
~; Hayes for more than a year was admitted by defendant
~including his cohabiting with her at the home of Dr. Miller
fin California for about a week although when first quesh~ tioned he denied any such affair and upon the coroner's
inquest under oath he testified untruthfully on the subject
by denying such intimacy.

i

L

When the officers arrived at the Sheppard home on the
morning of July 4th they found a medical bag of defendant open and on its end with some of the contents spilled
on the floor. Some of the drawers in the desk in the library
were pulled out and piled on the floor and the tools for defendant's outboard motor, which defendant kept in a green
cloth bag in the desk, were on the floor in front of the desk,
together with a broken statue. There was also a green box
containing fishing tackle on the floor near the tools. Marilyn Sheppard's wrist watch with dry blood on the band
was lying on the floor near the desk. The contents of one
drawer had been spilled out after Dr. Richard Sheppard
accidentally kicked it over. The drawers in the desk in
the living room were partly pulled out but the contents
thereof were undisturbed. The lid or cover of the desk was
open and resting on the back of one of the upholstered
living room chairs. There were some sales tax stamps and
papers scattered about on the floor near the desk.

'
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The Cleveland police department fingerprint ex
testified that there were no readable fingerprints on
desks or in other places about the house; that they
been wiped off or smudged, and on some of the furnit
surfaces he found long scratches as if the surfaces hai
been wiped with sandpaper or a rough cloth of some kin
This was equally true of the metal fishing box and drawer&
piled in the den.
The picture of Mrs. Sheppard's left wrist showed ati'~
impression of the wrist band of her watch in dry blood;
as if the watch had been pulled from her wrist after the .
blood had dried about the wrist band. About 1: ~O P.MY
the afternoon of July 4th, the mayor's son, while searching
the bank which extends down to the lake in front of the
Sheppard home and which is covered with very heavy ,
brush, found the green cloth bag containing the defend- ·~
ant's wrist watch, which had stopped at 4: 15, with dry
I
blood on the band and crystal and also containing his class
ring and key chain. The hour at which the watch was
stopped was 15 minutes after the latest time fixed by the
county coroner as the time Marilyn Sheppard came to
her death (between 3 and 4 A.M. on July 4th). There was
no blood on the bag and there is no dispute but that the
green bag was the one use~ by defendant to hold his out- ·h
board motor tools and that he kept them in his desk in the ~t·
den.
1

There was over $200.00 found in various places about
the house including defendant's wallet which contained
$63.00 and a check for a large sum of money, all of which
was easily discovered by the Chief of Police. Defendant
testified that he discovered his wallet which had been in

•

pocket, on the floor beside him after he came to in the
room. Except for the green cloth bag, defendant's
' atch, ring and key chain, there is no evidence that anyg was missing from the Sheppard home.
Defendant in his argument to the jury said:
"Well, of course, we don't claim there was a burglary.
I mean I don't know why the intruder was there. We
claim there was a man there but whether he was there
for burglary or not I don't know. We never claimed
that he was."
The evidence of the somewhat disarranged condition of
'the first floor of the house would tend to show the presence of an intruder, but if because of the manner in which
it was done and the other surrounding circumstances no
Ir such conclusion could be reasonably drawn from the evidence, such condition would give strong support to the
State's case. The defendant also argues that decedent
, came to her death at the hands of a sex maniac by whom
defendant was "clobbered" in his bedroom or on the
;:
~.stairway to the second floor, and on the beach. It would be
. difficult to believe that a sex maniac, after discovery,
~.would take time to set up the appearance of a burglary, or
f·that a burglar would throw away the only property found
,.to have been taken from the house, the green cloth bag
containing defendant's wrist watch, ring and key chain.
It is also hard to believe that a burglar would not
have found and taken defendant's wallet which he says
was on the floor beside him after he encountered the
r form in the bedroom, and after monies that were about the
· house, or that either a burglar or a sex maniac would take
time or go to the trouble of destroying fingerprints after

4
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the defendant was aroused from his sleep,
person, armed with a blunt instrument, would go abo·"·
his intended purpose without molesting the defen
whose presence asleep on the couch could not have b
missed.
When the defendant went to sleep on the couch th\
green bag containing the tools was in the desk and tht.
defendant was wearing his wrist watch, ring and kef:
chain.
~'
By defendant's own testimony, when responding to''
his wife's screams for help, he did not turn on the light&~
·'
either on the stairway while on his way to the be'droom;l
or in the bedroom. Light switches were conveniently~
placed for that purpose. That it was then in the dead of ,
night is clearly shown because when he was following the
form to the beach he said it was dark, with some refleco1 f
tion from Cleveland, and after coming to and starting back
to the hbuse, he testified the day was just breaking. The
discovery by defendant that his wife had been so badly
beaten "that he felt she was gone" particularly when he
returned from the beach and made as he claimed, his
second examination of her; that he should do so without
light, is a fact which the jury had the right to consider,
together with all of the other evidence of his conduct and
the surrounding physical £Jets, in determining the credibility to be given his story. Even though day was breaking, the evidence was undisputed that the window shades
were drawn in the murder room, except as to one window
which was up six inches to let in air. There is evidence in
the record by a neighbor that she drove by the Sheppard
home at 2: 35 A.M. on July 4th and saw two lights burn-

J
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, one on the first floor toward the east side of the house,
one on the second floor.
1 No mention is made by defendant about the family
, although he testified that the intruder must have
. n white, because a dog always barks at colored
,ple. The defendant did not hear the dog bark or at least
,e gave no testimony to that effect.
One significant fact to be considered is the passing of
,ime between the time of Marilyn Sheppard's death and
''.~e time defendant summoned help and what all the
...ctivities were that engaged the defendant's attention dur-

:ing that period.
f'

The coroner fixed the time of death as between 3 and
The first call by defendant asking
i_for help was made between 5: 45 A.M. and 5: 50 A.M. of
tthat day. The defendant testified that when he followed
the form to the beach, it was in the dark of night with
some reflection of light from Cleveland. At the time he
:came to on the beach, he testified that it was at about the
~break of day. It is a matter of public information that on
' July 4, 1954, the sun rose at 4: 58 A.M. Eastern Standard
time or 5: 58 A.M. Eastern Daylight Savings time. The
". break of day precedes sunrise by about forty minutes.
1.. So that either between the time of death fixed by the
coroner, at which time defendant testified he was in the
, bedroom where decedent died, having responded to her
'\ call for help, and in his testimony expressed the belief
'\I'· that she was then gone, or from the time defendant
~: started from the beach to the house after encountering the
.I>,
·~.form there (defendant's testimony being the only authority
' for this fact) from forty minutes to two hours passed.
;Ji:

{4 A.M. on July 4, 1954.

!
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There is little or no attempt to account for
actions during this period. It is also true that there w.,
neighbors on both sides who were not disturbed. Thi
were much closer in point of distance to the defend
than was Mayor Houk.
The evidence shows also that there was a telephon1
between the twin beds in the murder room which was not·
1
used by defendant to call help after he regained con~
sciousness from his first encounter with the form eithi
or the stairs or in the bedroom. Likewise, when chasmg'
the form to the beach, the defendant did not avail hims
of any weapon although there were firearms !vailable in'
the den and fire tools in the fireplace in the living room:'1
which he passed in going out the door to the lake side of!
the house.
The defendant's injuries were the subject of some
conflicting testimony. Doctors testifying for the State described his injuries as injuries to the right cheek of the;,
face, a black eye, some damage to the right side of his 1
forehead, some damage to the membrane of his mouth, '
and no indication of any injury to the back of the neck.
Doctors for defendant not only report the injuries to the
right side of his face, eye and mouth but also injuries to
the spinous process of the second cervical vertebrae and
some swelling on the bJck of the neck. They do not claim
that the skin was broken at this point. Whatever injuries
the defendant sustained were caused by a blow or blows
of the fist of an assailant. This was defendant's testimony,',,
although he testified that his first encounter was in the l
bedroom where his wife came to her death as a result of "
many blows on the head with a blunt instrument. It was

(

this occasion and only then, that the defendant claims

. t there might have been two assailants "one working
,?.,

· ·er his wife" and the other striking defendant from the
ck with his fist. While he was following the form to the
. ach there was no suggestion that there was more than
.e object or form in front of him.
.
The foregoing is a summary of much of the evidence
pealing with many of the physical facts and conditions of
.e premises as found on July 4th and of declarations and
tactions of the parties involved as testified to by the public
ruthorities and other witnesses, together with what the
~efendant said to others and in his testimony upon trial in
.relation to the events of the morning. The testimony of
/the defendant, in dealing with the events that took place
"ljn his presence or the things that he did, was characterized
~by the State as vague, indefinite, uncertain or factually
bughly improbable. During the time he was under cross!examination the defendant gave evasive answers such as
.,,'I can't recall" or "I can't remember,'' approximately 216
times to questions concerning facts and circumstances
lthat took place in his claimed presence material to the

r~ues in the case.
:~.

The jury, under the instructions of the court, was
··rresented with but one question or issue of fact and that
,was, "had the State shown beyond reasonable doubt that
"the defendant purposely killed Marilyn Sheppard?"
The State's case is based in part on circumstantial
l~vidence. The law of Ohio on this subject requires that the
']acts and circumstances upon which the theory of guilt is
based must be established beyond reasonable doubt and
;~
the facts so established must be entirely irreconcilable
''l"

:·}

(
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with any claim or theory of innocence and admit of
other hypothesis than the guilt of the accused. Carter,
State, 4 Oh. App. 193.
If, therefore, the jury, after careful deliberation, £o
that there was any possible hypothesis of innocence,
.
a consideration of all of the evidence, then the defendant'
would be legally entitled to be discharged, but if the jury1.
found, after full deliberation, there was no possibieJ
hypothesis of innocence based on the facts as they found
them to be, and that the facts found are such as to bei
irreconcilable with any other reasonable hypothesis, than1
the guilt of the accused, then a verdict of guilty 1was re-l
quired.
This was a jury question and we hold that there was :
sufficient evidence to support the verdict of guilty as
found by the jury.
Clpims of error Nos. 17, 18, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28 and 29
are therefore overruled.
Assignments of error under the heading of "The admission of testimony" in subhead VI of defendant's brief
will next be considered. During the trial, pictures in color
that had been taken of the wounds of Mrs. Sheppard's 1~:
head, after the blood had been washed away, were shown..
Six black and white pictu~es were developed from these
negatives and received in evidence, which were explained
by the deputy county coroner. The colored pictures were
then shown to the jury through the use of a projecting
machine on a screen six feet by six feet, the pictures being
four feet square. It is claimed that such pictures exaggerated the size of the wounds and unfairly emphasized
the evidence of the cause of death. Except for the size of

t

.e pictures, there is no claim that they were distorted or
ccurate. They dealt with a subject vital to one of the
ues of fact, that is, the cause of death and the severity

pf the blows.
In the case of Cincinnati Traction Co. vs. Harrison
(24 C. C. N. S. 1 on page 6) the court said on this subject:
"As to the photograph, it was an enlarged one, but
was not for that reason inadmissible."
The defendant was not prejudiced by the manner of
~·,

:.showing these pictures.
~
It is further claimed that the testimony of Mrs. Ahern
·with regard to conversations she had had with the decedent about divorce, was improperly received in evidence.
~ She testified that Mrs. Sheppard had told her that the
1· defendant had discussed the possibility of seeking a
divorce from her with Dr. Chapman while in California.
At the very outset of the trial the defendant stated as a
·. fact that he and his wife were happy and living a harmonious and lovable married life, and on his defense he
testified to support of such statement. Aside from the
alleged conversation between Mrs. Ahern and the decedent,
there is considerable testimony as to conversations the
defendant had with others (particularly Dr. Hoversten
and Miss Hayes) on the subject of divorce, such conversations being in part admitted by the defendant. He, however, denies ever suggesting seriously a separation with
his wife and maintains throughout that they lived happily
together. Statements such as were given in evidence or
testified to by Mrs. Ahern as a statement made by the
decedent, are always admissible to show that the statement was made or to establish the state of mind of thP
~

(
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parties where their relationship is material to the issuea:·
in the case.
1

In the case of Cassidy vs. Ohio Public Service Co.f'~
83 Oh. App. 404 (a negligence case), the court at page 410 'i
quotes with approval from 6 Wigmore on Evidence, (3rd,
Ed.) page 185, Sec. 1770 as follows:
1

"Where the utterance of specific words is itself a part.,,
of the details of the issue under the substantive law~
and the pleadings, their utterances may be proved
without violation of the hearsay rule, because they
are not offered as evidence of the truth of the matter
that may be asserted therein."
I
Also, in paragraph 1730 of the same work, headed "Statement of another (Bias, Fear, Malice, Affection etc.) Wife's
or Husband's Declarations."
''*

:!:

*

2. A special application is found in actions for
alJ.ienation of affections, criminal conversation, divorce
or wife murder where the state of affections of the
wife to her husband or of the husband to the wife becomes material. Here the declarations of the person
as to her or his own state of affections are admissible
under the present principle * * *" (Hearsay rule)
(emphasis added).
In 31 C. J. S. page 9f38 Title "Evidence," parag. 239,
dealing with independent relevant statements, it is said:
"Where the fact that a particular statement was
m;1de is of itself a relevant fact, regmdlcss of the truth
or falsity of such statement, the statement is admissible as evidence as an independent relevant fact."
The cases cited by defendant are not in point. Potter
vs. Baker, 162 0. S. 488, deals with spontaneous state-

f

.ents of third persons at the time of an accident. Geller
'~S. Geller, 115 0. S. 468, was concerned with the letter of
'an unknown third person and the other cases are likewise
Jar afield from the legal question here being considered.
Even if it be argued that there is no sound legal basis
for the inquiry of what the deceased said of statements
. of defendant to Dr. Chapman about divorce, yet, because
,; of the state of the record on that subject the defendant's
admitted relationships with other women which came to
the knowledge of the decedent, the watch incident which
was a part of the same conversation between the decedent
and Mrs. Ahern (the watch given to Susan Hayes having
been previously the subject of some slightly animated
discussion between defendant and his wife) we do not
find that the defendant was prejudicially affected by the
admission of this evidence abcmt which he complains.
Defendant complains also about the admission of testimony given by Mrs. Houk that the defendant told her that
in an automobile accident where no physical injury is apparent, a head injury could be easily claimed.
In view of the highly controverted state of the record
,, as to whether or not the defendant sustained an injury
}" to the back of his neck and head we find no error in the
::'!-·

admission of this testimony.
Defendant also complains about the extensive crossexamination of the defendant about Margaret Kauzor and
Mrs. Lossman and calling attention to the defendant's untruthful testimony given under oath at the coroner's inquest about his relations with Susan Hayes. The
defendant also claims as error a question directed to the
defendant on cross-examination which assumed that de-

f
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fendant killed his wife, to which the defendant answ
"That is absolutely unt~ue and unfair." The question
tainly was proper under the circumstances.
The defendant also claims error in permitting Ma:
1
Houk to testify to submitting to a lie detector (polygraph)
test. The record shows t hat Dr. Stephen Sheppard at oi1
point in the investigation, indicated that Mayor Houk w8'.:
in some way involved. After this was brought out
Mayor was asked "Did you, Mr. Houk, submit to a lie de-'
1
tector test?" to which he answered over defendant's obo. i
jection, "Yes." The results of the test were npt inquired!
~
about, and the simple fact that a test was made by agree-1
ment of the witness under the circumstances could not
prejudice the defendant's case.
We likewise overrule the claims of error because of .'-·
the claimed "unfair and biased testimony of the coroner."
If the coroner, in his testimony, was not testifying within
the orbit of his personal knowledge, cross-examination is
the weapon within the use of the defendant to demonstrate
that fact before the jury, to the damage of the State's case.
The foregoing claims of error are therefore overruled.
Errors concerned with the exclusion of testimony are
grouped by the defendant under the title "The Court erred
in exclusion of testimon~."
The first claim of error under this heading is the refusal of the court to require the coroner to produce certain
records on the claim that they were public in character.
The records referred to were the work sheets of the
technicians of the coroner's office. These papers are not of
the character of "public records," and no error was committed by refusing to direct their production in court.
1

1

'

' . The failure to order the coroner to produce a police
1port that had been given to him by the police department
t not error. This report is the same one that was later re,kived in evidence and while the court's ruling holding
t;pat the coroner need not produce a police department
record was correct, its later introduction would cure any
,.

:~possible

error.
\)
The defendant claims that he was restricted in his
~cross-examination of Dr. Hexter on the subject of shock
~~and as to the cross-examination of Officer Schottke on
'whether or not the defendant cooperated in the police investigation of the cause of his wife's death. Neither of
/these claims are well founded. After an objection to a
question put to Dr. Hexter was sustained because of its
form, the defendant conducted a searching cross-examination of the doctor on the subject of shock. Whatever restriction the defendant suffered by the court's sustaining
the objection claimed as error was fully corrected by subsequent questions which were fully answered. The questions to Officer Schottke asked for conclusions of fact and
the State's objections were properly sustained.
The next claim of error under this heading is the
~ court's refusal to permit evidence on what the defendant
calls similar offenses or other acts of burglary committed
or attempted in Bay Village. It is the claim of the defendant that homes of two citizens of Bay Village were entered
by intruders, one in September and the other on July 7,
1954. We know of no theory of law that would make such
testimony competent in this case. The court was not in error in ruling against the introduction of this evidence.

•
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The remaining claims of error under this heading1
concerned with the court's failure to permit a juro:'
question the defendant while he was testifying in his~
fense, refusing to allow Don Ahern to give opinion ,
dence as to whether or not the defendant was a "d1
sleeper" and also in sustaining objection to questions·i'
Dr. Adelson, the pathologist of the coroner's office, as ·
his opinion of the cause of the wounds on the hands f.
Mrs. Sheppard.
.
The right of a juror to ask questions of a witness d '
ing trial is clearly within the sound discretion of \he tri,
court. Utah vs. Anderson (Sup. Ct. of Utah) 159 A. L. R}
340. The practice is not encouraged because:
.
"generally jurors are not familiar with the rules gov·
erning the admission of evidence and in the very
ture of such a situation, counsel quite naturally wilJ'1
hesitate to object to a question propounded by a juror,
even though it may be competent, and this practice~,
so dangerous to the rights of the litigants that we can!P
not encourage the practice."
White vs. Little, 131 Okla., 132, 268, p. 221.
For further authorities see annotation following the,.
case of Utah vs. Anderson, 159 A. L. R. 347.
This claim of error is )herefore overruled.
it'
The other two claims of error just above listed are
likewise overruled, the questions involved not being material to the issues in the case.
Assignments of error listed in paragraph 6 of defend- 1
ant's brief entitled "Errors in conduct of trial" will now be~'
oomhlff~.
:
During the trial of the case (which lasted about
week( ·he bill of exceptions being bound

five'

.es, totaling 7,102 pages together with a supplemental
of exceptions containing the opening statements, of
6 pages) the court suggested on a few occasions that
.e proceeding was not going forward with sufficient dis, .tch and on one occasion the court said that it should not
:e over a day to determine the cause of death. There are
.er complaints of the defendant because of remarks of
, .e trial judge of which the following is typical:
1

"The Court: Well, Mr. Corrigan, we can't go on
with this witness forever. We will have to somehow or
other get through with the witness.
Mr. Corrigan: Well, he has not got his pictures
here.
The Court: Well, in any event, we are making
too much of a ritual of every bit of movement, and I
don't think we ought to take the time. It is not fair
to these jurors nor fair to anybody.

** *

Mr. Corrigan: Now, Your Honor, I am here to
defend a man for murder.
The Court: I know, but we try other murder
cases too. We have to try other people as well."
~: There was also some discussion before the jury about
the defendant demanding the return of the keys to his
~ouse, which he claims was necessary for him to have in
making out his defense. This claim is countered with
proof that defendant or his representative was at liberty
to go to his house at any time on request, when in the

::company of a police officer.
, It is likewise claimed that there was disorder during
~e trial and defendant in his brief lists eleven places in
lhe record when order was called for because of noise in
h?
'y out of the courtroom.
(
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It is also claimed that the court arranged the co~c'
room to accommodate a great many representatives of thl
press, radio and television and other news disseminating·
agencies, thus restricting accommodations available for
others. The record shows that the defendant's family wa8.
~
provided for and that the defendant's brother, Dr. Stephen~•.
Sheppard, although a witness was permitted by order of·~
the court to remain in the courtroom throughout the trial. ;~
,ti
The court in this case was presented with a very difficult ~.
matter because of the unusual amount of coverage attempted by the press, radio and television agencie1. The
arrangements made by the court were within its sound ''
discretion. Certainly the defendant was afforded a public
trial, and from a reading of the record, we cannot say that
the court in seeking to maintain an orderly proceeding j
abused its discretion in directing the courtroom arrange- · '
men ts.
1
,

Pierpont vs. State, 49 Oh. App. 77;
Makley vs. State, 49 Oh. App. 359.
It is also claimed that the jury was not properly admonished upon separation during the trial.
A careful examination of the record as to each of the
foregoing claims of error shors that the proceedings were
regular in every respect and the claims of error are therefore overruled.
It is likewise claimed in this section that the court
should have charged on the included offenses of "Assault
and battery and assault" and that in holding the jury together for five days after submission of the case, coerced
them into agreeing on a verdict.

'

The claim that assault and battery and assault should
~have been charged must be overruled. There is no ques•ltion but that decedent was killed as a proximate result of
!. the unlawful wounds inflicted upon her person. Death,
without question of doubt, resulted from the unlawful acts
of the killer, and the only factual issue in the case being
' whether or not the defendant committed the various assaults on her person. The case cited by defendant of Bandy
vs. State, 102 0. S. 384, 131 N. E. 499, is direct authority
" against this claim of error. Paragraph 2 of the syllabus
"2. If the indictment charges murder in the first
degree in the perpetration of a robbery under Sec.
12400 G. C. and there is no evidence tending to support a charge of murder in the second degree, or manslaughter, as distinguished from murder in the first
degree, then the defendant, upon the failure of proof
as to murder in the first degree, is entitled to an acquittal, and in such case it is not error for the court
to refuse to charge either murder in the second degree
or manslaughter."
See also State vs. Muskus, 158 0. S. 276, 109 N. E.
2d, 15.
The case was submitted to the jury on the morning of
Friday, December 17th. At the noon hour the jury was put
under the care of two bailiffs who were sworn and instructed as to their duties. The deliberations of the jury
continued through Saturday and Sunday, the defendant
objecting to the Sunday session. On Monday evening, no
communication having been received from the jury as to
their progress the court instructed the parties that at 10
P. M. the bailiff should inquire as follows:

•
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"Have you arrived at a verdict? If not, is there a prob"
ability that you can arrive at one if you deliberate~1
while longer, either this evening or tomorrow? If '
which would you prefer?"
The jury's reply was that they were close to a verdi~
and desired to retire at that time and resume deliberationsf
in the morning. The jury ~eturned its verdict on Tuesday{t'
December 21, 1954 at 4: 33 P. M.
··
At no time during their deliberations did the jury orl
any member of the panel, suggest that there was no hope ~i
of a verdict or that they did not desire to conti~ue theirl
deliberations. The jury was called into open court three _;
times a day during deliberations so that there were many
opportunities for them to express their feelings if they de- ~1:
sired to do so. With the great number of exhibits and 7,102
pages of evidence the jury was unquestionably painstaking irn its approach to the serious question presented to
them and their willingness to take whatever time that was
reasonably necessary under the circumstances, to do justice between the State of Ohio and the defendant, cannot
be grounds for criticism. We do not find that there is any . ·
basis for the claim that the jury was coerced into a verdict.
The claims of error under the heading "Errors in conduct of trial" are therefoie overruled.
The defendant groups assignments of errors Nos. 14,
22 and 23 under the title "The court erred in its charge
to the jury."
The defendant requested the court to reduce its
charge to writing as provided by Sec. 2945.10 R. C. which
provides:

4
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"The court, after the argument is concluded and before
proceeding with any other business shall forthwith
charge the jury. Such charge shall be reduced to
writing by the court if either party requests it before
the argument to the jury is commenced. Such charge
or other charges or instructions provided for by this
section when so written and given shall not be orally
qualified or modified or explained, by the court." * * *
Before the trial was concluded, the court had written
its charge and a copy given to counsel for the State and
for the defendant before argument. The trial came to an
end after counsel for the State concluded its final argument
to the jury at about 4: 15 P. M. of Thursday, December 16,
1954. The court then addressed the jury as follows:
"The Court: Ladies and gentlemen of the jury we
will now be adjourned until, shall we say, nine o'clock
tomorrow morning. I would like to get a fairly early
start, but if we are not all here at nine o'clock we will
not, of course, until we are all here, but as soon as
possible after nine o'clock I would like to have the
court convene. In the meantime, will you be very
careful-now we are in the closing stages-not to
discuss this case or reach any point whatever where
you are seeking or securing any information or notions or statements from anybody about it. The law
of this State provides that when a jury is charged with
the final word in the case, and a jury proceeds in the
secrecy of its jury room to deliberate and to determine
the issues that are to be determined, that from that
point on, and continuing until such time as they and
the Court together, if that should have to come to
pass, are not able to agree--or rather, they and the
Court are agreed that the jury cannot agree upon a
verdict, or a verdict is rendered, the jurors must be

•
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:cember 16th and the opening of court on December 17,

kept together. This case is important. It may
.
you a short time, nobody knows. It may take yo
some time, nobody knows. But, in any event, I
sure you appreciate that fact that it is a case that doe$•,,
need deliberation and care in its decision, whatevel;~
that decision may be, and for that reason, it may gJ;.
over tomorrow. If it does, it will be necessary for you};
to remain in the comfort-some people think it is a'
discomfort-of a downtown hotel. The Court will'..
take care of all of those details, if they are to be taken ·,
care of, so I am saying to you now so that you may
come tomorrow morning prepared, if necessary, to~
remain in a downtown hotel tomorrow ni~ht underA
the care and as guests of the Court and its officers.
l~
Mr. Corrigan: I except to the instructions of the ~
Court.
The Court: Sir?
Mr. Corrigan: I except to your instruction.
The Court: What is erroneous about it?
, Mr. Corrigan: I say, I except to your instructions.
The Court: Oh, yes, all right. Without any formality at all, we will be adjourned until 9 o'clock tomorrow morning." (Whereupon adjournment had.)
Court was then adjourned until 9 A. M. of Friday,
December 17, 1954. At this time in the absence of the
jury, the defendant excep,ed to parts of the written charge
on reputation and character evidence and on the law as to
circumstantial evidence and presented requested charges
in writing which requests were overruled. The court then
proceeded to read its written instructions to the jury in
open court without deviation from the prepared charge.
The record does not show that any other business of
the court was conducted after the close of court on De-

(

~

.

.954.
~-

From the foregoing recital of the record, it is clear
. ·at no part of the court's instructions on the law of the
}:ase was given on Dec. 16th and that the entire charge
,!on the law was in writing as requested by defendant. Sec.
'1,~45.10 R. C. was strictly complied with so that claims of
·~or that the court failed to reduce its charge to writing,
, ~t part was given one day and part the next, and that
·~
~·the court failed to give its charge immediately after con,, eluding arguments, must all be overruled.
.. '
The duty to proceed to charge the law of a case as rei; quired by Sec. 2945.10 R. C. supra, means to proceed within the regular hours of the court day which are provided
~· for by Rule 23-C of the Common Pleas Court of Cuyahoga
1.
[ County.
The defendant assigns as error under this division of
the brief (error No. 23) that the court refused to give writ'', ten instructions on points of law before argument. This
error is claimed but there is no argument in support of it
in the brief.
Sec. 2945.10-E R. C. provides:
"When the evidence is concluded, either party may
request instructions to the jury on points of law which
instructions shall be reduced to writing if either party
requests it."
This section empowers, but does not require, the court
i

\ to give such instructions. The following cases support the

·~. court's denial of such request and there is no claim that
'1;

the substance of such requests were not included in the
general charge of the court.

•
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State vs. Petro, 148 0. S. 473, 76 N. E. 2d 355; ..
Grossweiler vs. State, 113 0. S. 46, 148 N. E.
Wertenberger vs. State, 99 0. S. 353, 124 N. E. 24'.,
State vs. Williams, 85 0. App. 236, 88 N. E. 2d, 420~,
State vs. Cheatwood, 84 0. App. 125, 82 N. E.
770.

Paragraph 4 of the syllabus of Stewart vs. State, su-

·a, provides:
"In a criminal case it is error to instruct the jury that
evidence of the defendant's good character is not to
be considered by the jury or made available to the
defendant except in doubtful cases; the true and
proper rule being to leave the weight and bearing of
such evidence to the jury. Harrington vs. State, 19
0. S. 264 approved p. 268." (Emphasis added.)

iJ.

There remains to cor1isider the court's charge on th;
subject of the use of character evidence and the rule to be
followed when the State's case depends entirely or in sul>.!
stantial part on circumstantial evidence.

The charge on circumstantial evidence was as fol-

]

On the first question, the court charged tl;.e jury as 1
follows:
"Some evidence has been given in this case con-~
cerning the claimed general conduct and reputation '
of the defendant and it is proper to present such evi- ;
deuce for your consideration. It is not admitted be1m1se it furnishes proof of guilt or innocence, but be- ,,
cause it is a matter of common knowledge that people
of good character and reputation do not generally
commit serious or major crimes. Such evidence, if believed, may be of some help to you in your consideration of the total evidence and the situation as a whole.
The court wishes to caution you, however, that good ·~
character and good reputation will not avail any person charged with a ~crime against proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt."
This charge is fully supported by the holding of this
court in the case of State vs. Neal, 97 Oh. App. 339, 118
N. E. 2d 424 (Motion to certify overruled). We hold that
the law was correctly stated by the court.

'

Harrington vs. State, 19 0. S. 264;
Stewart vs. State, 22 0. S. 477.

"* * *

Where circumstantial evidence is adduced, it
together with all the other evidence must convince
you on the issues involved beyond a reasonable doubt,
and that where circumstantial evidence alone is relied
upon in the proof of any element essential to a finding
of guilty, such evidence; together with any and all
other evidence in the case, and with all the other facts
and circumstances of the case as found by you, must
be such as to convince you beyond a reasonable doubt
and be consistent only with the theory of guilt and
inconsistent with any theory of innocence. If evidence
is equally consistent with the theory of innocence as it
is with the theory of guilt, it is to be resolved in favor
of the theory of innocence."

The request of the defendant is in substance the same
t, as the charge as given, and as given is fully supported by
ts the case of Carter vs. State, 4 Oh. App. 193. The defend. ant's claims of error Nos. 14, 22 and 23 are overruled.
Finally, paragraph 8 of defendant's brief claims "Er, rors in overruling the motion for new trial.''
There is some claim that the jurors were allowed to
; separate and to communicate with outsiders by telephone
~

~~;

.
'
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during their deliberations. A photograph was taken of
jury in the dining room of the Carter Hotel. Their sep .
tion was only sufficiently far apart to enable a separa~
picture of the men and women to be taken. The juro~j
remained in their respective immediate presence except fot'
sleeping purposes. All telephone communications were to,
members of the family of the jury, and there is no evidence,
that these telephone calls, made in the presence of a bailiff,
were anything but proper.
We have given full consideration to the question of,
the sufficiency of the evidence as supporting the verdict m·
this case in another part of this opinion dealing with the '"
motion to direct a verdict, and it seems unnecessary to restate what was said there. For the reasons stated in that
part of this opinion, we hold that the court was fully
justified in overruling the motion for new trial.
The record in this case was most extensive and the
briefs' presented by counsel, although likewise extensive,
have been of great assistance to this Court in the work of
resolving the legal questions presented, it being remembered that a reviewing court is not called upon to determine questions of fact relating to the guilt or innocence of
the defendant, a function which in the first instance is
solely within the provincl of the jury. The court in overruling the many assignments of error is unanimously of
the opinion that the defendant in this case has been
afforded a fair trial by an impartial jury and in the opinion
of this Court substantial justice has been done. Sec.
2945.83 R. C. in part provides:
-~

"No motion for a new trial shall be granted or verdict
set aside, nor shall any judgment of conviction be re"~rsed in any court because of: * * *

t

(C) The admission or rejection of any evidence
offered against or for the accused unless it affirmatively appears on the record that the accused was or
may have been prejudiced thereby.
(D) A misdirection of the jury unless the accused was or may have been prejudiced thereby.
(E) Any other cause unless it appears affirmatively from the record that the accused was prejudiced
thereby or was prevented from having a fair trial."
A careful study of the record and the authority of the
. foregoing section of the Code of Criminal Procedure ret' quires that the judgment be affirmed.
Judgment affirmed. Exceptions noted.
KoVACHY,

J., HURD, J., concur.
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APPENDIX D.

g his motion for a new trial on the ground of newly
iscovered evidence.

Opinion of the Court of Appeals on Appeal from
Denying New Trial' on the Ground of Newly
covered Evidence.

~·

,~" The motion reads:
"Now comes the defendant, and moves for a new trial
on the ground of newly discovered evidence material
to the defendant, which he could not with reasonable
diligence have discovered and produced at the trial,
and the defendant further requests that an oral hearing be had on this motion."

No. 23,551.
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
CUYAHOGA COUNTY, EIGHTH DISTRICT.

STATE OF OHIO,

Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
SAMUEL H. SHEPPARD,

Defendant-Appellant.
OPINION.

July 20, 1955.
KovACHY,

P. J.:

Samuel H. Sheppard was convicted of murder in the ·~
-~
second degree by a jury in the Common Pleas Court of .J
1
Cuyahoga County and sentenced to life imprisonment in :
the Ohio State Penitentiary. He appealed that conviction
and judgment to this Coutt in State of Ohio vs. Samuel H.
Sheppard, Case No. 23,400, which judgment has been af- '
firmed and opinion filed dealing with the claimed errors
in that appeal.
This is a separate appeal emanating from that cause
on the sole ground that there is error in the record and '
proceedings in the Court of Common Pleas of Cuyahoga .'
County prejudicial to the rights of the defendant in over- )

'

The defendant produced at the hearing on this motion,
! in support thereof, the affidavits of the witnesses by whom
: such evidence was expected to be given and the prosecut.lng attorney produced affidavits to impeach the affidavits
: of such witnesses, all in accordance with sub-paragraph F
~;of Section 2945. 79 of the Revised Code of Ohio.
' t.
There were filed by the defendants:
Affidavit N. D. E. 1 made by Samuel H. Sheppard. It
deposes that he is right handed.
Affidavit N. D. E. 2 made by Arthur E. Petersilge, one
of counsel for defendant. It sets forth that, on several
.~occasions
during the trial, he sought delivery to the de..,_
·~ fendant of the keys to the home of the defendant and his
~murdered wife, and that such request was refused by the
~office of the County Prosecuting Attorney until December
,t 23, 1954-two days following the rendition of the verdict
by the jury.
t<....
Affidavit N. D. E. 3 made by Stephen A. Sheppard,
brother cf defendant. It sets forth that he received the
keys to the defendant's home on December 23, 1954; that
~ without using them for any purpose, he turned them over
1· shortly to his brother, Richard N. Sheppard.

f
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Affidavit N. D. E. 4 made by Richard N. Shepp.
brother of defendant. It sets forth that he is Administra'
of the Estate of the deceased ·Marilyn Sheppard; that he
ceived the keys from Stephen A. Sheppard on Decem
23, 1954 and that on January 23, 1955, he made the pr
ises (scene of the murder) available to Dr. Paul Kirk
that Dr. Kirk examined the prremises on January 23rd
24th. Affiant says that there was no change of any kin~
made in the interior of the dwelling from the time he reJ
ceived the keys until after completion of investigation andJ
examinations within the dwelling by Dr. Kirk.
,,
Affidavit N. D. E. 5 made by Dr. Virgil E. Ha\vs, an~
Osteopathic Physician and Pathologist. He states he visitedQ
the home (scene of the murder) on February 12th, 1955, "
accompanied by Dr. Richard Sheppard, Dr. Stephen Shep- 1
pard and Reverend Robert G. Scully, Pastor of the Rocky"
River Methodist Church. He states that the purpose of the ·
visit was to remove two (2) blood spots from the wardrobe or closet door on the east wall of the bedroom which
was the scene of the murder. He described in careful detail how that purpose was accomplished and states that
the spots were placed in separate bottles and sealed in a .~
mailing tube and handed to Reverend Scully, marked Spot
"A" and Spot "B."
Affidavit N. D. E. 6 nlade by Reverend Robert G. "';
Scully. He corroborates the recital of Dr. Haws as to the
removal of the blood spots; states the mailing tubes were
then and there sealed and handed to him; that he mailed
them to Dr. Paul Kirk, Berkeley, California, on February
14, 1955.
Affidavit N. D. E. 7 made by Dr. Paul Leland Kirk, an
author-· on Criminalistics, who is at present in charge of

.e School of Criminology of the University of California.
e shall consider its contents later.
; Affidavit N. D. E. 8 made by William J. Corrigan, one
.counsel for defendant, in rebuttal to the affidavit made
_ 'Y Dr. Marsters for the State and received by telephone
porn Dr. Kirk. It is in reply to Dr. Marsters' affidavit. We
:r

't~U consider its contents later.

f

There were filed by the State:
Affidavit N. D. E.-A made by Saul S. Danaceau,
~~sistant County Prosecuting Attorney. He states that in
r November 1954, there were discussions touching the sub' ject of turning over the keys to the house to Dr. Richard
A. Sheppard, father-in-law of Marilyn Sheppard, de. ceased, and the then Executor of her Estate and that the
f
' request was denied. He also states that from the time the
~ Prosecuting Attorney or his assistants entered into the
case in July 1954 to the present time (April 1955):

1

"he does not know of any instance where the defense
was denied a request to inspect the said home or to
make any investigation therein."
Affidavit N. D. E.-B made by Dr. Samuel R. Gerber,
Coroner of Cuyahoga County. He states that in October
1954, Fred Garmone, of Counsel for the defendant, visited
his office and there, in the presence of Thomas Parrino, an
Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, inspected a large number
of articles which were held for evidence and which came
' from the house in which the deceased was murdered. The
articles are listed in detail under captions: Bedding from
bed of victim; Clothing of victim, Marilyn Sheppard;
Clothing of Dr. Sam Sheppard, in "Hallmark" box. He
also states that counsel was shown a model of the head of

'
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the victim and made notes of his view of said articles
model.
Affidavit N. D. E.-C 'made by Leona Phalsgraff
Raymond Keefe, Secretary and Property Custodian, 1
spectively, of the Coroner's office. They assert that
Anthony J. Kazlauckas, a former Deputy Coroner of
County, visited the Coronet's office in October 1954 an1
on behalf of the defendant was permitted to examine
the items which were examined by Mr. Garmone, as
forth in the Coroner's affidavit, and that Dr. Kazlau
further examined:
1
Autopsy protocol, Case 76629 (M. 7280) Marilyn'.
Sheppard Conclusions for Laboratory findings.
f~
X-rays of Marilyn Sheppard, Case 76629 taken"
,.
at Coroner's office.
·~
Affidavit N. D. E.-D made by Dr. Roger W. Marsters;;
in charpe of the Maternity Rh Laboratory at the Univer-'
sity Hospitals in Cleveland (a clinical laboratory). We .
shall consider its contents later.
The bill of exceptions of the trial of the principals
cause, totaling 7102 pages, a supplemental bill containing
20G pages and a great number of exhibits in Case No. 23,400
were also filed in this ap~eal. The facts therein are set~
forth in the opinion rendered in that case. These two ap- ~.
peals have been considered and decided simultaneously.
The proceedings in the trial court were had under
authority of Section 2945.79, Revised Code of Ohio, whichli
reads in part:
"A new trial after a verdict of conviction may be
granted upon the application of the defendant for any

(
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of the following causes affecting materially his substantial rights:
A)B)C)D)E)F)-when new evidence is discovered material
to the defendant, which he could not with reasonable diligence have discovered and produced at the
trial."
The allowance of the new trial, as set forth in the
,·Statute above, is bottomed on the proposition that the new
'.evidence uncovered could not have been discovered and
1
produced at the trial by the exercise of reasonable diligence. This is a basic and necessary requirement under
the law. If it were otherwise, a defendant might well take
a languorous attitude toward the trial of his case, be indolent in the marshalling of defensive evidence and decide
to take his chances on the state being unable to prove him
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt and even be so bold as to
hold testimony in his behalf in reserve to be used as
grounds for another trial in case he be found guilty.
"A person indicted for a crime and on trial cannot be
allowed to speculate upon the outcome of his trial and
to hold back evidence which he may easily procure,
with the hope and expectation that, should the proof
against him be more convincing than he anticipates,
he can put the state to the additional expense of
another trial, at which the evidence that he has suppressed can be introduced. The law favors a full discovery of all relevant evidence which has a bearing
upon the criminality of the defendant. It will not permit the accused to mask his batteries, and, havin(

82a

83a

thus drawn all the fire of the prosecution, hef~
after having been convicted, take the chances
trial in which everything would be in his fa~:·
Underhill's Criminal Evidence, Fourth :t,,
pages 1507 and 1508.

t;Kirk on his visit here in January, 1955, together

~

The Supreme Court in Domanski vs. Woda, l_"'
208, states the law in paragraphs three and four'"·
syllabus as follows:
'
"3. Newly discovered evidence is other
which might have been known before the te
of a trial had due diligence been used.
"4. Where during the trial of a case a partY~~
reasonable cause to believe that favorable and~
able evidence of a material nature exists, it is his,l
in the exercise of due diligence, to ask for rl'
tinuance, if necessary, to investigate, and to p:
such evidence, if found. Having finally submi
case without doing so, and having searched f1
fdund the evidence after verdict, he may not~
successfully claim the right to a new trial on the.
that such evidence is newly discovered."
See Kroger, Adm. v. Ryan, 83 0. S. 299, 94,_
~
428;
c~
State v. Brown, 35 0. L. Abs. 77, 39 N. E. (2}
~-'

The newly discoveref. evidence claimed by ~
fendant in this case was presented to the trial court in·
'1
affidavit of Dr. Paul Leland Kirk. The defendant, in eJ
··~;
says that his claimed newly discovered evidenc~j
gathered from the bedroom in which the murder was ·
mitted and from exhibits which had been admi
evidence during the trial and thereafter put in the c·
of the Prosecuting Attorney, where they were e

(

riments conducted by him in his laboratories at
:versity of California subsequent thereto.
'"endant-appellant argues that he was prevented
linaking this investigation and performing these
.ents in time for the trial because the state, through
.
uting Attorney of Cuyahoga County and the
{Of Police of Bay Village, retained possession and
!i~ of the premises until December 23, 1954, two days
Pie rendition of the verdict by the jury, when the
:the home were turned over to the administrator of
· -.ered wife's estate and that that was the first time
.e murder that he was afforded access to the place.
.e facts with respect to this phase of the case are
· Marilyn Sheppard was murdered in the bedroom
home in the early hours of July 4, 1954. The Chief
of Bay Village, John F. Eaton, took immediate
. ion and control of the house and held the keys to
· .• late in August when he turned them over to a
tative of the County Coroner. The Coroner in
,ve them to the County Prosecuting Attorney. The
t and members of his family were excluded from
.e. On a few occasions, however, they were allowed
, with a police officer in attendance, to remove
"cles of clothing and other personal possessions.
lie authorities completed their examination of
on August 12, 1954. On August 23, the defend.de a written request of the Chief of Police for return
lJteys to his house. This request was refused. Vari·" ·er attempts to obtain possession and control of
1use were later made by counsel for the defendant
'i;!.

~
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and the executor of the estate of Marilyn Sheppard-all
no avail. Around November 3, 1954, the keys were re~
turned to Chief Eaton by the Prosecuting Attorney. D~
ing the trial the defendant subpoenaed the keys into court:"
·1
through Chief Eaton and demanded the right to retahi}:
them. The trial judge, however, ruled that they must
remain in the possession ~f the police of Bay VillageJ,
which order was carried out until December 23, 1954, ~~
when complete possession of the house was given the defendant. There is no evidence that any request to enter ~
the house for the purpose of investigation and in~pection
was ever made by the defendant nor does the record show
any formal application to the court at any time for a like .
purpose. Dr. A. J. Kazlauckas, a physician and expert
who had spent many years as a deputy coroner of Cuyahoga County, was in the employ of the defendant. He
exami1u1d all the articles of property pertaining to this
case in the possession of the County Coroner, together
with the autopsy report, conclusions of laboratory findings
and X-rays of Marilyn Sheppard and yet made no effort to
make any scientific examination of the premises. He was
not even presented as a witness during the trial. Assistant
Prosecuting Attorney, Saul S. Danaceau, deposes in his
affidavit that he informed 1'rthur E. Petersilge, of counsel
for the defendant, and the brother of the defendant, Dr.
Stephen Sheppard, in early November, "that the said
house was available to the defendant at any and all times
to inspect or conduct investigations therein." It seems,
however, that it was understood that on all occasions a
police officer would have to accompany the defendant or
any representative of his when visiting the home.

i

(

Chief of Police, John F. Eaton, testified as follows in
:respect to this matter on pages 6076, 6077 and 6078 of
e bill of exceptions:
"CROSS EXAMINATION OF JOHN EATON

By Mr. Mahon:
"Q. Chief, since you have had that key-you got
it sometime in November, the key to the house, is
that right?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. From that time down to date has the house
been accessible to the Sheppard family?
A. Yes, it has.
Q. And have they been in the house during that
period of time?
A. Once, on one occasion, at least.
Q. To take care of the heat, and so forth, and
water, and all of those things?
A. Yes.
Q. Is that right?
A. Yes.
Q. Have they ever been denied at any time the
right to go into that house since you had possession of
the keys?
A. They have not.
RE-DIRECT EXAMINATION OF JOHN EATON.

By Mr. Corrigan:
Q. Each time any member of the Sheppard family went in the house they had to get your permission?
A. That's right.
Q. And each time they went in, they were accompanied by a police officer?
A. Yes, sir.

4
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RE-DIRECT EXAMINATION OF JOHN EATON

By Mr. Corrigan:

Q. And the order that Sam Sheppard could nof
go into his home, where did that come from?
A. * * * There was no order he could not go in his'.
home.
Q. The order that Sam Sheppard could not go ~
into his home except in the custody of a policeman·:,
or with a policeman, how did that originate?
A. That was suggested, I believe, by the prosecutor' s office."

~ded as a method to reconsider the evidence introduced
~at the trial of the case for the purpose of impugning the
r
soundness of the verdict brought by the jury. If the courts
{permitted such practices, the inherent certainty of a trial
r
by jury would soon wane and such function in our system
; Qf jurisprudence ultimately disintegrate and disappear.
lYet a major part of Dr. Kirk's affidavit deals with evidence
presented at the trial and ventures his opinion and con' clusion with respect to it together with a criticism of the
methods of investigation and technical evidence presented
: by the prosecution. This, of course, was entirely beyond
;,the scope of this instrument and the trial court had the
indisputable right to totally disregard every particle of it,
which it did. The affiant states in his affidavit that "no instructions or suggestions were made to him as to what to
find or what not to find by the attorney representing the
i defendant." We believe that Dr. Kirk could have spared
~himself much effort and time had he been told by the
,; attorney for the defendant the narrow scope allo\ved him
. under the law for further investigation. Certainly much
{ that is extraneous and redundant might thereby have been
left out of this affidavit.
The appendixes describe various experiments carried
~. on by Dr. Kirk to supplement and fortify his theories in
; connection with many elements of this case. All of them
except one deal with "blood."

t

The burden of proof to show that this require:mrnt of.~·
the law has been complied with is on the party moving ~
for a new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence. ~
The Supreme Court of Alabama states it

Slaughter v. State, 237 Ala. 26; 185 So. 373:
"An accused who moved for new trial on ground
of newly discovered evidence has burden of showing
due diligence."
The affidavit of Dr. Paul Leland Kirk comprises thirty-three typewritten pages and incorporates by reference
sixteen supplemental pages, classified as appendixes A to
J, and forty-six photographs, taken and developed by Dr~
Kirk.
~
In its total aspect, it is a most extraordinary and un- ~
usual document when related to the purposes to be served
by it. The sole purpose of an affidavit offered to support
a motion for a new trial on the ground of newly discovered
evidence is to inform the trial court of the substance of the
evidence claimed to be newly discovered which will be
presented at a new trial if one is granted. It is never in-

.
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"A" is labeled Blood on Watch Band. In this experiment he daubed an expansible metal watch band liberally
"' with freshly shed blood in two separate experiments-in
one, after twenty minutes, the band was dipped in fresh
water and moved slowly back and forth and in the second,

•
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4. A bar of soft wood, 23" long, 1" wide and

the blood was allowed to dry for one and one quarter ho~
and treated similarly. The time required to dissolve tht.
blood was noted.
"B" is labeled Time of Drying of Blood. In this experiJJ
ment the same watch band illustrated in "A" was daubed\
Iii
liberally with fresh blood I from a punctured finger. The 'I:
time of drying on smooth surfaces and in the recesses of ,
the individual bars was noted. Blood also was smeared
:t
over the back of the band and the time for drying noted. ·~

7/16" thick.
5. A small ball pein hammer, with a head length
of 2112" and a face %" in diameter.
,-'
The first experiments involved dipping these objects
" in liquid blood, removing them and holding them over
~paper, recording the time necessary for all blood to drain
or drop from the object. This was supplemented by a
similar timing while the object was swinging at a moderate

"C" labeled Blood Trails and gives his opinion as to :~
the significance of the blood spots found throughout the ";)
house, particularly with reference to the steps.
"D" is labeled Shedding of Blood from Clothing. Experiments were made with five series of cloths, cotton,
wools, rayon, and silk. These were suspended and liquid
human blood thrown against them by means of a brush
dipped' in blood and the time taken when the blood was
<1pplied and measured until the last drop fell spontaneously from the garments.
"E" is labeled Spots from Weapon. Two series of experiments were performed with a variety of objects which
would illustrate efiects similar to some common weapons.
They were:

1. A large bread knife, with a roughly triangular
blade 8" in length and a breadth at the widest point
of 11/z".
2. A large monkey wrench, 15" in length, with
a jaw 1 %" deep and a maximum opening of 4".
3. A brass bar, 11 %" in length, %" wide and
1/s" thick.

4

rate in the hand.
Then a similar set of experiments was made with objects 1, 2 and 3 above, in which the dripping weapon was
carried over long strips of paper at ordinary quick walking
speeds, and the distance measured to the last drop that
fell.
,,,

"F" is labeled Transport of Blood by Shoes. This experiment was performed by stepping repeatedly in a region of heavy blood spots on a floor until the shoe soles
were thoroughly blood-smeared and then having a person walk normally along a strip of wrapping paper until
no more blood was visually apparent on the paper. The
last visible trace of blood was then measured.

"G" is labeled Blood Removal from Shoes. The experiment consisted of daubing a shoe with leather sole
and stitching with about two dozen spots of freshly shed
human blood. Most of it was placed along the stitching
but various spots were placed at random on the leather of
the sole. The shoe stood for thirty-five minutes to allow
complete soaking of the blood into the leather and complete drying. It was then immersed in water and forced

'
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back and forth in the water to simulate the wasting ai ,
of water movement for five minutes. The condition of j
shoe as to blood spots was then noted and any spots
remaining were rubbed vigorously with paper tow r
until no actual spots could be seen, this to simulate ,lii
action caused by walking. The shoe thereafter was i
mersed in fresh water for' five minutes and removed ., .
allowed to dry. The tenacity with which blood adb., ·
to such surfaces was thus shown.

t

"H" is labeled Amount of Blood Spatter on Clot
This appendix discloses the spatter of blood oh the '
of coveralls worn during the entire series of experime1r
It also was determinative of any dripping of blood from
£'~!"~'=~~-

:: ·. =: . =:-:
:: • • -=: · - .= · : :·::: .:: ::·: : ' from - ·
Origins. In this experiment a \Vooden block was

appr6ximating the hardness of a skull. A layer of ·
rubber 1/s" thick was placed over it, this being abou:"··
thickness of the subcutaneous layer of the foreheai -·
scalp. Then a sheet of polyethylene plastic, to s· ·
the skin, was placed over the sponge rubber. The
ment so prepared was placed on a stool on wrapping
to collect blood spatter. ~Around the region was b
rectangular wall carrying removable paper strips to
all flying blood on the sides and in front of the sw·
the object used as a weapon. Paper strips to collect ,
flying upwards were placed over the top. Only on ·
operator's side was the structure open, the operator}
lecting the blood that traveled backward. The objects
as weapons included a small ball pein hammer; a "·
twc4 U flashlight with a flared rim; an inch steel bar~:

;(~
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:'"'.es long; a brass rod 20 inches long, bent at right anon the end; a brass bar, % inches in diameter and 2
long. Blood was puddled on the top of the plastic
·er and heavy blows were dealt that at least with one
ect, the plastic sheet and rubber sponge were cut
bugh to the wood. The paper strips were removed from
· walls after each series of blows of a certain type and
ect and photographed. The characteristics of the spatblood from impact as well as the throw-off blood on
·· fore and back strokes were noted from the standpoint

"J" is labeled Breaking of Teeth. Experiments were
'.ed on with seven incisor teeth chosen from some 15 to
· or teeth obtained from dentists who had extracted
a: To anchor the roots of the teeth solidly as in a jaw,
i/Y'ere drilled in a heavy brass bar. A hole was filled
.olten "Woods" metal, an antimony alloy that melts
,,.ithe boiling point of water, the root was held in the
"· metal until the alloy was solid and all teeth so
could not be moved until the metal was remelted.
.ethod of breaking the teeth varied but usually conof pulling steadily on them by means of a hooked
·cut in a brass bar. Tests were also made attempting
an unmounted tooth with the bare hands. The
" of fracture was then studied and compared to the
fragments found in Marilyn Sheppard's bed.
. .ese experiments were devised by Dr. Kirk after an
_Ction of the Sheppard premises and a view of all the
''t.·
lilts in the hands of the Prosecuting Attorney. There
··~ason that we can see that would have prevented
. ·om carrying out the same program before or dur'.e trial of this case in the exercise of due diligence. t
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The affidavits and the evidence at the trial disd
'!!
a disposition on the part of both the Chief of Police of ~
Village and the Prosecuting Attorney of Cuyahoga Coun~
to comply with any reasonable request for such inspectio~
of the premises. Moreover it is inconceivable that a forma{
application to the Presiding Judge in the Criminal Branch'
of the Common Pleas Court for the exercise of such right{
·•f
would not have been granted. These experiments conse- ·
quently cannot be considered newly discovered evidence. f
They could have been prepared for presentation at the trial
had due diligence and reasonable foresight been exercised J~
by the defendant and no grounds for the allowabce of a
new trial exist on this claim.
':if.

');j

1

In Salinardi v. State, 124 Conn. 670, 2 A (2) 212, the
Supreme Court of Connecticut had the following to say:
"To entitle a defendant in a criminal prosecution to a
new trial for newly discovered evidence, it is indispei1sable that he should have been diligent in his
efforts fully to prepare his cause for trial, and if the
new evidence relied upon could have been known
with reasonable diligence, a new trial will not be
granted."
Aside from the question of due diligence, these experiments, in our opinion, could not have been admitted
in evidence in the trial of this murder case. Experiments,
to be admissible as evidence, must be performed with identical or substantially similar equipment and under conditions closely approximating those existing at the time of
the occurrence being investigated. None of the material
used for these experiments was the same as that existing
at the time of the murder. The most important, the head of

t

,:-e victim, was attempted to be simulated by a contraption
' njured up by Dr. Kirk without any scientific correlation
the original body whatever. The weapons used were
selected on the basis of pure speculation. The teeth were
'not related to those of the deceased for strength or hard, ness. Furthermore, the coagulation of blood differs with
different persons and is affected by the factors-the tern, perature and the humidity. The temperature and humidity
in the bedroom at the time of the murder are unknown and
! the coagulation time of Marilyn's blood as well as the
;, blood used in the experiments are unknown. How would it
be possible under these unknown factors as to both material and conditions to conduct experiments acceptable
; in a court of law? It must be said that they are interesting
and no doubt would be of value in a textbook on the subject but clearly they would have no probative value in the

t

trial of this cause.
The rule is stated in 17 Oh. Juris., Sec. 479, page 587,
as follows:
"The general rule is that to render experiments or evidence of experiments made out of court, admissible,
the conditions need not be identical with those existing at the time of the occurrence in question; it is
sufficient if there is substantial similarity. The Ohio
courts accord with this general rule. But obviously
the probative value of experiments will depend upon
the correspondence of the conditions under which
they are performed to those of the occurrence being
investigated. If there be an exact correspondence of
such conditions the experiment will amount to a
demonstration and be conclusive upon the issue; dissimilarity of conditions and experiments may affect
not merely the weight of the evidence, but its admf
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sibility. * * * If it is utterly impossible to perfo: ··'
an experiment upon facts and under circu~stan1 ,,
substantially similar to those in issue, evidence offer,
of an experiment is inadmissible."
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Paragraph seven of the syllabus of Bickley v. Seara,
Roebuck & Co., 62 Oh. App. 180, (Motion to Certify over:]
ruled by the Supreme Court), states:
·
<

1

-~·.

1

"7. Evidence as to the result of experiments made
by a party after an accident, to be admissible, must '
show the facts surrounding the experiments were·
substantially the same as they were at the time of the
accident."
I
Paragraph one of the syllabus of State v. Farrell, 64 '
0. L. Abs. 481 (Court of Appeals, Eighth District, Motion·,
to Certify overruled) reads:
f
"1. It is not necessary, in order to render experi- .~
mcnts or evidence of experiments made out of court ~
admissible, that the conditions be identical with the l
conditions existing at the time of the occurrence in
question; it is sufficient if there be substantial simi- .~
larity; however, the probative value of such experi- 1
ments depends upon the correspondence of the con- .i
ditions under which they are performed to those of
the occurrence under investigation."
Dr. Kirk, in his affidkvit, under the title Technical
Evidence of the Prosecutor discusses Water under defendant's wrist watch Crystal; Loss of T-Shirt; The claimed
drying of blood on Mrs. Sheppard's wrist before her watch
was Jved; and Drying of blood on defendant's watch
vas inserted in the green bag.

'

· the title Blood Trails, he discusses Clothing;
'.in of hands (or face, etc.) ; and Shoes and then

(discusses Green Bag and Contents; and Blood on Defend,. 4nt' s Clothing. His opinion as to each of the indicated subjects is based upon experiments described in Appendixes
A, B, C, D, E, F, G, and H. They amount to mere criticism
of the manner in which the prosecution's evidence was
gathered, doubt as to its evidence having any bearing at all
on the guilt or innocence of the defendant and his personal
opinion as to its significance. In no sense can this be interpreted as newly discovered evidence.
The next division in the affidavit is entitled, The Mur,. der Scene, and the main discussion comes under the heading Blood Distribution. He here describes the distribution
of blood on the walls, defendant's bed and the radiator.
By determining the point of origin, he gives the opinion
that the head of the victim was essentially in the same position during all of the blows from which blood was spattered on the defendant's bed; that her head was on the
sheet during most, if not all of the beating that led to the
blood spots; that probably all of the blood drops on the
east wall were thrown there by the back swing of the
weapon used; that the blows on the victim's head came
from swings of the weapon "which started low in a left
hand swing, rising through an arc, and striking the victim
a sidewise angular blow rather than one brought downward vertically." He then explains the Cause of Distribution and comes to the conclusion based on his experiments
as described in Appendix I and his observation of the
blood distribution in the bedroom that the blows were
struck by a left-handed person. He then proceeds to explain the impact spatter, and the throw-off drops of certain

•

96a

97a

weapons and decides that the blood spots on the doors
the bedroom were drops made by the back-throw oft
lethal weapon, and that a very large spot on the wardro
door could not have come from the back-throw of th
weapon. This spot measured about one inch in diamet~
He then expostulates that "this spot could not have com
from impact
It is highly improbable that it couM
have been thrown off a weapon" and that "it almost cer.
tainly came from a bleeding hand.-The bleeding hanO
could only have belonged to the attacker."

spatte~.

••

We read this portion of Dr. Kirk's affidiivit with much
interest for it displayed high qualities of originality and
imagination, blended with a wide range of knowledge of
the subject discussed. However, none of it is newly dis·
covered evidence as contemplated by the law and has no
juridical value in this case because:

(6) the impossibility of performing experiments
to approximate the facts and circumstances of the occurrence involved.
17 Oh. Juris., Sec. 479, p. 588 reads:

"If it is utterly impossible to perform an experiment upon facts and under circumstances substantially similar to those in issue, evidence offered of an
experiment is inadmissible."
In paragraph four of the syllabus of Ohio Power Co.
v. Fittro, Admx., 36 Oh. App. 186, it is stated:

"4. In action for death by electrocution, demonstrative evidence to show distance voltage would
jump from wire held properly excluded, in view of
impossibility of performing experiment on facts in
.
"
issue.
Also 17 Oh. Juris., Sec. 324, page 415 reads:

( 1) it includes matter that could have been
offered at the trial had due diligence been exercised;
(2) at
most
the facts involved had been given to
the jury
the oftrial;

( 3) the conclusion that the assailant was a left.
handed person was argued to the jury at the trial and
besides was not a subject for opinion evidence since
it was a conclusion for the jury alone to draw in the
exercise of its colnmon sense and ordinary knowledge
from the facts and circumstances as shown by
the evidence;
( 4) the opinion that the large spot could not
have come from the murder weapon was guesswork
since the weapon itself is unknown;
( 5) the statement that the large blood spot came
from
the bleeding hand of the assailant is sheer suPposition;

4

"Jurors are supposed to be competent in everything
pertaining to the ordinary and common knowledge of
mankind, and to be peculiarly qualified to determine
the connection between cause and effect established
by common experience, and to draw the proper conclusions from the facts before them."
The syllabus of Perkins v. State, 5 0. C. C. 597 states:
"Upon the trial of a case, where the accused is charged
with murder in the second degree, physicians having
been called on behalf of the state, who testified that
they attended the post mortem examination, giving
a full description of the wounds found upon the head
of the deceased, their location, and that they were
sufficient to produce death, it is error to permit such
witnesses to give testimony against the objection of
the accused as to the probable relative position of the
parties at the time the fatal blow was struck; such

'
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testimony is the mere opinion of the witnesses b
upon the facts proven, and from which the jury is
capable of drawing proper inference as the witnesses.
The wounds on Marilyn Sheppard's face and hea1"
show a vicious attack with great force directed to vi
spots. Because of their character, number and locatio
the jury may well have conc1uded that the wielder of the
weapon, being impelled by consuming rages and sudden·~
animosity, had a definite purpose to kill and further that{'
a person so motivated would strike from any direction l
necessary to accomplish his purpose.
1

In view of these circumstances, the deductions of Dr.
Kirk that the pattern of blood spatter, the position and ;'.
.-fl
direction of the victim's head and the assumed position of ~'~
the assailant is only consistent with the hypothesis that the
murderer was a left-handed person is, in our opinion,•
highly SP,eculative
and fallacious.
I
The next division of Dr. Kirk's affidavit is titled Blood
Groups and Individuality. He states that the grouping of
the large spot of blood found on the wardrobe door was
performed simultaneously with the same sera and cells
and in identical manner as the known blood of Marilyn
Sheppard removed from tae mattress and the second
large spot (%"in diameter) removed from the wardrobe.
The latter was used for a control test and dissolved readily
in distilled water and gave no sign of delayed agglutination, as was true of the known blood of the victim, but the
large spot "was definitely less soluble than that from the
smaller spot, or from controls from the mattress" and "in
nning the agglutination tests, in every instance and with

'

• ,ts for both A and B factors, agglutination was much
ower and less certain than the controls. The fact that
!elayed agglutination occurred indicated clearly that this
ilood was also 0 group, but its behavior was so difr.·
,ferent as to be striking. These differences are considered
" constitute confirmatory evidence that the blood of the
''to
_large spot had a different individual origin from most of
':the blood in the bedroom."

The balance of Dr. Kirk's affidavit deals with Tooth
'Fragments, Blood-stained Bedding. The Weapon and Miscellaneous Items 1) Victim's Slacks; 2) Top sheet of
·;Victim's bed; 3) Pillows; 4) Nail Polish Fragments and
5) Leather Fragment. All of these matters were covered
in detail in the trial of the case and under no circum.t stances can be called newly discovered evidence. Nevertheless, he undertakes to state his own ideas concerning
~. them and advances his personal theories as to their significance in the case. We know of no rule of law permitting a re-evaluation of a decided case by a person
versed in criminalistics with the purpose in mind of laying
the groundwork for a new trial.
,

The final subject of the affidavit is styled-Reconstruction with the sub-title-Defendant's Account. In this
discussion, the affiant gives his own version of the murder
• from the standpoint of his interpretation of the physical
facts and then adroitly fits in the defendant's story to conform to the same. It is inconceivable that such testimony
could be given to a jury at a retrial of this cause. It would
be usurping the function of the jury.

f
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The Supreme Court in Fowler v. Delaplain, 79 0.
279, paragraph one of the syllabus, says:
.~
;··1

"A question to a witness which calls for his opinion on
the precise issue of fact which the jury is sworn tQ.
determine from the evidence, is incompetent."
Also, Protection Ins. Co. v. Harmer, 2 0. S. 452, paragraph three of the syllabus:
"Opinions are only admissible, where the nature
of the inquiry involves a question of science or art, or
of professional or mechanical skill, and then only
from witnesses skilled in the particular business to
which the question relates."
I
Dr. Kirk's opinion as to the large blood spot, discussed above, requires further consideration on our part.
Dr. Roger W. Marsters, a recognized authority on
blood, deals entirely with this claim of Dr. Kirk's in his
affidavit. He states that "Under ideal conditions * * *
variability occurs in the routine performance of blood
1
grouping ' ' * *. These variables are almost always quantitative differences rather than qualitative ones. * * *
Dr. Kirk is postulating difierent qualities of type 0
blood char:lctcristic. Even under ideal conditions of fresh
blood reactions, sub-groups of type 0 are unknown.
Therefore, to assume the exis\ence of another quality of
type 0 and especially another individual source on the
basis of some quantitative difference in reaction and
solubility employing an admittedly complex technique
cannot be justified."

He admits "differences in regular blood grouping
do occur * * *," and that "much greater differences occur
in grouping dried blood because of variation in the conditions under which blood is stored, admixture with
foreign substances * * *," but says "these conditions * * *
,'do not apply to the present case." He further says that
'f variations in behavior of different types of blood are due
to minor variations in technique or conditions and that
these are extremely small when run by experienced persons, that samples of blood of two different persons, even
· though of the same group * * * will often behave differently; and that any variation in them of a magnitude
greater than small experimental variation, when treated
identically, must be significant.
He claims that the two spots in this case "were deposited on the same paint, on the same panel of the same
door and close together." They appeared normal, were
free of contaminating substances and that there was "no indication of any accidental or uncontrolled variation between the two spots that could account for the differences
claimed.''
He says "No postulate was made by me of different
qualities of Type 0 blood characteristic, nor of any hypothetical 'sub-groups.' Rather the claim concerns different qualities of blood, both of which happen to be of
Type O," and cites Lattes "Individuality of the Blood" as
authority "that wide differences do occur in Group 0
bloods."
He further states:

Dr. Kirk in his rebuttal affidavit questions the qualifications of Dr. Marsters in absorption grouping of dried

(

f

"7. Solubility differences claimed do not rest on
different times necessary to dissolve difference size of
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re-dissolved; this is a very delicate process and ma)'j
readily lead to serious errors."
'
On page 271 he states:'
"These quantitative differences cannot easily be util-\
ized in forensic cases relating to blood-stains, for the ~J
blood in these has invariably undergone changes due "
to age or other deleterious circumstances, which \
attenuate the agglutinins."
On page 272 he states:
"These sub-groups would appear to be fairly constant,
though, since we have to deal with quantitative differences (Thomsen), the possibility of differentiating
between them for forensic purposes would seem to be
likely to remain somewhat uncertain.
The differentiation between individuals belonging to Group 0, which Landsteiner and Levine claim
to have accomplished by means of human iso-agglu..:
tinating
sera is still more problematical."
I
On page 292 he states:
"Further, in investigations where we have to start
from dried blood, particularly in forensic cases, the
methods suggested by a number of writers, as we saw
on page 268, do not prevent the occurrence of mistakes, and might even be said to favour them."
Dr. Kirk seems to beli~re that the fact that the large
spot dissolved more slowly and that the agglutination tests
appeared more slowly is "confirmatory evidence" that this
spot originated from a different individual. Such difference in reaction is quantitative only. It, under no circumstances, denotes a qualitative difference. The weight
of the expert opinion seems to be that such differences
may he attributable to factors of contamination. It must

(

be remembered that this large blood spot was on the wardrobe door some eight months during changes of temperature, humidity, and in a room that had had many persons
milling about, doing various chores, and conducting many
't
r tests. Moreover, it was scraped from a door covered with
coats of paint. How much of this paint was removed at
: the time of scraping no one knows. The test is a delicate
,. one involving small quantities of material. A large drop
of blood, too, would take longer to dry. What bacterial or
chemical contamination befell it is not known. Fingerprint dusting powder, ultra-violet light, dust, detergent
deposit, perspiration or body oils of human origin were
present in the room. Dr. Kirk himself in his book on
"Crime Investigation" says on pages 198 and 199:
"O blood which contains neither A or B agglutinogen
contains both agglutinins, * * *"
and on pages 199 and 200, he says:

"It is also clear that variations of considerable magnitude in the strength of reaction exists between persons classed in the same group. For this reason, there
are various subclassifications such as Ai and A2 in
use among serologists. The distinction between these
rests chiefly on the strength of reaction and can be
obtained satisfactorily only when fresh blood is available. With dried blood stains, the form in which most
blood appears in evidence, it is not simple to determine the subgroups with certainty."
and on page 201:

"It should be noted further that, on standing, the agglutinins are slowly lost in many bloods. For this
reason, a test which depends only on testing for agglutinin is to be trusted completely only when the
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blood is comparatively fresh, or when the results
checked also by methods testing for the presence
agglutinogen as well.'"
From a careful consideration of the affidavits on tbli;
subject, as well as the authorities referred to above, w~i
find:
(1) that Dr. Kirk's contention rests on the difference in time in the appearance of agglutination of
the large spot when compared to the same reaction of
known blood of Marilyn and the smaller spot used as
a control;
1

(2) that Dr. Kirk believes that this difference
confirms the presence of a person at the murder scene
other than the victim and the defendant;
(3) that experts contra say that such differences
are not unusual even with known samples of the same
blood and at most is a quantitative and not a qualitative difference;
( 4) that all three blood samples were of the same
blood Group, known as 0;

( 5) that the samples tested, being dried blood
exposed for some eight months in a room subjected
to much activities by many persons, who examined
and tested various parts of the room, were exposed to
contamination of ma~F sorts: bacteria, fingerprint
dusting powder, hand or body oils and perspiration,
dust and other substances;
(6) that in the removal of the stain from the
wardrobe door, paint, soap and detergents may have
been scraped off;
(7) that experts agree that tests conducted on
dried blood are not as reliable as those made on fresh
blood;

(

(8) and that no court, to our knowledge, has accepted such findings as proof of blood from different
persons.
We conclude from all the foregoing that the opinion of
1 Dr. Kirk that "These differences are considered to constitute confirming evidence that the blood of the large spot
had a different individual origin from most of the blood in
the bedroom," even though such blood had the same blood
grouping as that of Marilyn Sheppard's, is based on claims
so theoretical and speculative in view of Dr. Marsters'
affidavit, the statements of authority referred to by Dr.
Kirk and his own writings on the subject as to have no
probative value in support of defendant's claim of newly
discovered evidence.
A motion for a new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence is directed to the sound discretion of the
trial court.
The Supreme Court in Taylor v. Ross, 150 0. S. 448,
in paragraph two of the syllabus, states:
"2. The granting or refusing of a new trial on the
ground of newly discovered evidence rests largely
within the sound discretion of the trial court; and
when such discretion has not been abused, reviewing
courts should not interfere. (Paragraph two of the
syllabus in the case of Domanski v. Woda, 132 0. S.
208, approved and followed.)"
See:

26 0. S. 1, Smith & Wallace v. Bailey;
96 0. S. 410, State v. Lopa;
124 0. S. 29, 32, Canton Stamping v. Eles;
132 0. S. 208, Domanski v. Woda;
148 0. S. 505, State v. Petro;
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7 0. L. Abs. 711, DeSantis v. Brumbaugh;
12 0. L. Abs. 173, Martin v. State.

51 0. L. Abs. 185, State v. Tarrant;
13 0. L. Abs. 244, Pannell v. State;
2R 0. L. Abs. 166, Cebulek v. Tisone.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion m
regard.

The trial court in its written opinion on this question

said:
"It is not reasonable to believe that production of the
testimony of Dr. Kirk at the trial, and the countertestimony of Dr. Marsters, would have made the
slightest difference in the total evidence, and certainly not resulted in a different conclusion by the
jury."

Paragraph three of the syllabus
of The People v. Fice,
I
97 Cal. 459 reads as follows:

"It is not an abuse of discretion for the trial court to
deny a motion for a new trial in a criminal prosecution, made upon the ground of newly discovered evidence, where the affidavits offered in support the1eof
are fully contradicted by counter-affidavits on the part
of the prosecution."

It is the law with respect to a motion of this kind that
a new trial will not be granted on the ground of newly discovered evidence unless the affidavits in support thereof
contain statements
which, if it had been offered in evidence
I
at the trial, would have required the jury to return a different verdict.

" We believe the trial court was in the best position to determine that question.
Having read the voluminous evidence of the murder
trial, studied in detail the affidavits filed in support of and
contra to the motion, and the briefs of counsel, and having
come to the several conclusions stated above, we unanimously hold that the trial court did not commit prejudicial
error nor abuse its discretion in overruling the motion for
a new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence.
Judgment affirmed. Exceptions. Order see journal.

The Supreme Court in Cleveland, Columbus, Cincinnati & Indianapolis R. R. Co. v. Long, 24 0. S. 133, says:

SKEEL, J., HURD, J., concur.

"A new trial should not be granted on the ground of
newly discovered evidence, unless the legitimate effect
of such evidence, when co~idered in connection with
that produced on the trial, ought to have resulted in a
diflerent verdict or finding. The rule of practice, on
this subject, was not substantially changed by Section
297 of the Code of Civil Procedure."
See:

7 0. L. Abs. 583, Cleveland Ry. v. Leanza;
4 0. L. Abs. 53, Licate v. State;

t
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APPENDIX E.
!

Judgment of Court of Appeals Affirming Judgment,;
on Verdict.
July 20th, 1955:

'udgment of Court of Appeals Affirming Order Denying
New Trial on the Ground of Newly Discovered Evidence.
.July 25, 1955:

Appeal by Sam H. Sheppard,
(Law).
This cause came on to be heard on the appeal on
questions of law from the judgment of the Court of Common Pleas and was argued by counsel for the parties; and·.
upon consideration of all of the errors assigned, the Court ,
finds no error prejudicial to the appellant and therefore
the judgment of the Court of Common Pleas is affirmed.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this
Court directing the Court of Common Pleas to carry this
judgment into execution. Appellant excepts. /s/ Julius
M. Kovachy, Presiding Judge.

t

Received for filing July 20, 1955. Leonard F. Fuerst,
Clerk of Courts. By A. M. Harrington, Deputy. (Jr. 20,
pg. 201.)

t

APPENDIX F.

Appeal by Samuel H. Sheppard, Defendant-Appellant
, (Law).
This cause came on to be heard on the appeal on
questions of law from the judgment of the Court of Common Pleas of Cuyahoga County, Ohio, overruling the
·motion of appellant for a new trial on the ground of newly
.. discovered evidence, and was argued by counsel for the
parties; and upon consideration of all of the errors assigned,
the Court finds no error prejudicial to the appellant nor
any abuse of discretion, and therefore the judgment of the
Court of Common Pleas is affirmed. Appellant excepts.
(Jr. 20, page 203.)
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